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A Call for a Unified Business
Organization Law
John H. Matheson* and Brent A. Olson**
The authors propose a wholesale reformation of business organization
law. The current regime of business organization law reflects an attempt to
blend the benefits of limited liability with conduit or flow-through taxation.
The result has been a haphazard development of business forms, often created
to satisfy shifting federal tax law guidelines. The authors trace this develop-
ment, from the traditional corporation and partnership forms through limited
partnerships and Subchapter S corporations to the recent organizational
forms of limited liability companies and limited liability partnerships. The
authors show how the search for the ideal organizational form has failed, leav-
ing an unwieldy morass of choice of entity issues for the business owner.
The authors propose a two-tier framework to overhaul existing business
organization law and classification. Traditional corporations would continue
in existence. The remaining myriad of business forms would be replaced by a
simplified Standard Business Organization ("SBO") governed by a Standard
Business Code ("SBC"). The hallmarks of the SBO under the SBC would be
limited liability for owners, pass-through taxation, free transferability of inter-
ests, perpetual existence or continuity of life, and presumed owner manage-
ment. These attributes conform to the default features most desired by
business owners.
Consistent with recent changes by the Treasury Department and the Inter-
nal Revenue Service in the traditional entity classification scheme for taxation
purposes, the two-tier framework combines the benefits of consistency, flexi-
bility, and simplicity. Current laws and regulations governing business orga-
nizations formed as corporations would remain intact, allowing states to
continue to "race to the top" (or bottom), and affording a substantial federal
entity-level tax base from these entities. The SBC would provide a flexible,
owner-oriented operational structure for the SBO while avoiding entity-level
taxation, except where the SBO chooses to become publicly traded. The result
is a vastly simplified system of business organization law that elevates the sub-
stance of desired business organization law elements over the form of attrib-
utes necessary to satisfy federal tax guidelines.
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[A]ll forms of business organization are essentially the same, mere
variations on the same theme.... Entity is found with and without
limited liability; there is limited liability without entity; and there
are quasi-entities with and without limited liability. The constructs
of business law are not immutable verities, ideal forms, but rather a
rough patchwork partly the result of historical accident, partly the
result of invention, and.., partly the result of eclectic combination
of forms. And each of the fifty states has its own patches on the
patches.'
Introduction
The ever-expanding law governing the formation and operation of busi-
ness organizations encompasses everything from sole proprietorships to large
publicly traded corporations.2 Amid these extremes resides a seemingly end-
less variety of business forms and combinations of forms, including, among
others, general partnerships, limited partnerships, limited liability partner-
ships, master limited partnerships, limited liability companies, joint stock
companies, business trusts, and "partnership associations. ' '3 The existing
myriad of laws and regulations governing business organizations results in an
1 Robert A. Kessler, With Limited Liability for All: Why Not a Partnership Corporation?,
36 FoRDHAm L. REV. 235, 252 (1967).
2 For a definition of publicly traded corporations, see Jom H. MATHESON, PUBLICLY
TRADED CORPORATIONS: GOVERNANCE, OPERATION AND REGULATION § 1:02 (1994).
3 Some business organizations address narrow, particular types of businesses (such as pro-
fessional associations and not-for-profit organizations) and will not be considered further.
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increasingly vast and disjointed realm so cumbersome and abstruse as to con-
found all but the most die-hard business law scholars and practitioners.
Many states boast over a half dozen separate statutes and codes gov-
erning the organization and operation of business entities. States typically
consider each organizational entity as wholly self-contained; each statute pro-
vides a comprehensive set of legal default rules for a distinct business organi-
zation. Each state's enactments often have somewhat unique characteristics,
multiplying the morass fifty times over. In addition, the Treasury Depart-
ment ("Treasury") and the Internal Revenue Service ("Service") have codi-
fied several separate strains of tax law to address the issues unique to these
distinct business organizations4 and have addressed the other state-law ma-
nipulations on a case-by-case basis, thereby making business organization tax
attributes as varied as the business forms that exist.5
The law of business organizations has thus become a hodge-podge of
unwieldy, illogical, and even irrational legislation and decisions bristling with
incoherence and inconsistencies. 6 Bursting at the seams, the fabric of busi-
ness organizational law currently blanketing the nation has become a varie-
gated quilt of legal passwords.
Fundamental reform of business organization law is both imperative and
inevitable. Comprehensive reform, however, requires an understanding of
both the underlying nature of business organizations-their fundamental ba-
sis and essential character-and the root causes of the current dysfunctional
state of organizational law. At bottom, the potential power and simplicity of
business organization law has been obscured and frustrated by a myopic fo-
cus on taxation issues; the Treasury and the Service have, in effect, dictated
the substance of business organization law.7
In this Article, we explore the underlying nature of business organiza-
tion law-a necessary precondition to devising a unified business organiza-
tion framework-by probing the evolution of the limited liability/double-tax
4 See I.R.C. §§ 701-709 (1994) (Subchapter K governing partnerships); id §§ 1361-1363
(Subchapter S governing S corporations), amended by Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996
("SBJPA of 1996"), Pub. L. No. 104-188, 110 Stat. 1755.
5 The cited variations do not even address the separate levels of state and local taxation
that add to the complexity. In addition, various federal and state regulatory laws, such as securi-
ties regulation laws, have to be interpreted in the light of this complexity.
6 See William J. Rands, Passthrough Entities and Their Unprincipled Differences Under
Federal Tax Law, 49 SMU L. REv. 15 (1995) (asserting that the tax law regarding pass-through
entities should be reformed and uniform rules should be established).
7 But what if the Service was removed from the equation, or more precisely, what if the
role of taxation was, at long last, simplified to the point of allowing a business entity to elect
either entity-level or conduit taxation? Amazingly, in 1996, the Service in effect conceded that it
is the inappropriate organ to dictate the business organization laws of the several states. See
infra Part II.F. Specifically, the Treasury has indicated that it intends to exit the organizational
law quagmire. See infra notes 199-210 and accompanying text. This is really quite extraordinary:
the final roadblock to arriving at a coherent and logical business organization law may soon be
reduced to a historical footnote. Once freed from its tax fetters, business organization law could
take one of two courses: (1) an optimal, unified business organizational law could emerge, in-
jecting much needed uniformity, simplicity, efficiency, and clarity into the current business or-
ganization wasteland; or (2) in a wild frenzy, legislators could develop still more forms of
business organizations as each state caters to its various constituencies.
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dilemma. Part I of this Article sets forth a brief history of the law governing
business organizations, highlighting the twin strands of taxation and limited
liability that form the double helix from which all business organizations de-
rive. Part II analyzes the role of taxation in the organizational form and the
failure of the efforts to deal with the liability/tax issue.
We then argue that business organization law should consist of a simple
two-tier business organizational structure. Part Ill sets forth our proposal for
simplifying business tax law and for unifying business organization law by
introducing a structured, all-encompassing framework that lays the ground-
work for model business organization legislation. Part IV analyzes and inves-
tigates the impact of our proposal upon the current business law terrain.
We reform business organization law by dismantling the current regime
in favor of a simple two-tier statutory framework. One statute retains the
traditional corporate code ("TCC") in which the business organization is
formed as a corporation and is taxed as a separate entity. This entity is some-
times referred to as a C corporation. We term it the traditional corporate
organization ("TCO"). Any organization wishing to be governed by this rel-
atively clear and rigid model must confront double taxation. The second tier
exploits our unification principle by distilling the myriad of non-TCC busi-
ness organization statutes into one simplified statute, the Standard Business
Code ("SBC"). We refer to the resulting simplified entity as the Standard
Business Organization ("SBO"). This SBC replaces all business organization
statutes other than the TCC.8
The current maze of organizational statutes and tax rules cries for a uni-
fication principle that would enable every jurisdiction to adopt a uniform
statute and allow the Treasury and the Service to issue uniform regulations as
to a single business entity. Granted, this is no simple task; as yet no such
proposal exists. 9 This Article fills this void by proposing a model framework
for unifying business organization law.
8 To be sure, no business would have to organize and file under either the TCC or the
SBC. Those businesses not so electing would be governed by the common law of agency, sole
proprietorship, and partnership. It is expected, however, that such organizations would be rela-
tively few, as the advantages of limited liability that flow from formation under either the TCC
or the SBC would be inviting for any organization other than those informally organized without
counsel.
9 There have been a handful of attempts, however. For example, three states-New
Jersey, Michigan, and Ohio-developed legislation creating a "limited partnership association."
Pennsylvania also had this cumbersome statute until 1965 when it was repealed. See generally
Edward R. Schwartz, The Limited Partnership Association-An Alternative to the Corporation
for the Small Business with "Control" Problems?, 20 RuTGERs L. REv. 29 (1965) (propounding
the use of the limited partnership association form for small, localized enterprises). Looking
back several decades, two scholars have considered the possibility of a single small business
structure. See Harry J. Haynsworth, The Need for a Unified Small Business Legal Structure, 33
Bus. LAW. 849, 867 (1977) (suggesting "an unsophisticated, vastly over-simplified" framework to
"stimulat[e] further thought and debate"); Kessler, supra note 1, at 277-306 (proposing model
statute for a partnership-corporation).
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L Confronting the Limited Liability/Double-Tax Dilemma: The
Evolution of Business Organization Law
A. Limited Liability as the Linchpin of Business Organization Law and
Modern Capital Accumulation
The recognition of the existence of an incorporate person necessar-
ily involves the recognition of the three following principles: (i) A
corporation is a person distinct from its members; (ii) the property
of the corporation is distinct from the property of its members; (iii)
the property of its members cannot be taken in execution for the
debt of the corporation, and vice versa.' 0
The classic sole proprietorship or general partnership contemplates one
or a small group of business owners that actively participate in the business."
The personal assets of sole proprietors and general partners remain unpro-
tected and exposed to attachment by creditors. 12 These owners face the pros-
pect of unlimited personal liability for the obligations of the business, except
as may be limited by insurance or agreement.
Traditionally, the major advantage of doing business in the corporate
form was the ability of business owners-shareholders-to limit their per-
sonal liability for the debts and obligations of the business to their actual and
promised contributions. Business creditors must look to the corporate assets
for satisfaction of claims. Creditors generally cannot proceed against the
shareholders' personal assets because they are shielded from loss by the cor-
porate entity.13
Over time, more closely held businesses that might have been operated
as sole proprietorships or general partnerships began to incorporate, often in
10 3 WnLIiAM HoLoswoRTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 482 (1942) (emphasis omitted).
11 See REVISED UNIF. PARTNERSHI Acr §§ 301,306, 401,404, 6 U.L.A. 33-34, 45, 51-52,
58-59 (1995) (providing that all partners are agents of the partnership, bear joint and several
liability for partnership obligations, share profits and losses equally, have equal rights to manage
the partnership, and owe each other general fiduciary duties of loyalty); UNIF. PARTNERSHIP
Acr §§ 9, 15, 18(a), 18(e), 21, 6 U.L.A. 400-01, 456, 526, 608 (1995).
12 See REVISED UNIF. PARTNmRsIp AT §§ 306-308, 6 U.L.A. 45, 46-47, 49-50; UNIF.
PARTNERSHIP Acr §§ 15-16, 6 U.L.A. 456, 501.
13 See e.g., REVISED MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT § 6.22(b) (1984) (amended 1996) (stating
"[u]nless otherwise provided in the articles of incorporation, a shareholder of a corporation is
not personally liable for the acts or debts of the corporation . . ."); cf. REVISED UNMF. LTD.
PARTtnsms ACT § 403 (amended 1985), 6 U.L.A. 177 (1995) (providing that in a limited part-
nership only the general partners are personally liable for debts to third parties). Using princi-
ples developed under the common law, creditors might proceed against personal shareholder
assets if a court could be convinced to "pierce the corporate veil." See LEwIs D. SOLOMON &
ALAN R. PALMITER, CORORATIONS: ExAMPLEs AND EXPLANATIONS §§ 6.1-28 (2d ed. 1994)
(discussing how creditors often seek to have the court disregard the corporate form and impose
unlimited personal liability on shareholders and managers). Additionally, legislative enact-
ments, such as environmental liability laws, sometimes impose liability directly on the owners.
See, eg., Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CER-
CLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 107(a)(1), 9601(35), 9607(a)(1) (1994) (making an owner of a facility where
hazardous substance is found responsible for clean up); Lynda J. Oswald, Strict Liability of Indi-
viduals Under CERCLA: A Normative Analysis, 20 B.C. ENVT. AFF. L. REV. 579 (1993).
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order to obtain limited liability protection.14 Limited liability thus represents
the primary distinguishing feature between a corporation and a sole proprie-
torship and general partnership. By limiting responsibility for corporate ac-
tions to the assets of the corporation while immunizing the owners' personal
assets, corporations can attract other owners whose risk of loss is limited by
the amount of capital contributed to the corporation.
1. The Legal Development of Corporate Limited Liability
American law governing corporate limited liability has a contentious his-
tory. In the 1800s, Thomas Cooper described limited liability as a "mode of
swindling, quite common and honourable in these United States" and "a
fraud on the honest and confiding part of the public."'15 Yet, early in the
twentieth century, President Butler of Columbia University acclaimed lim- '
ited liability as "the greatest single discovery of modem times [and that] even
steam and electricity are far less important than the limited liability corpora-
tion, and they would be reduced to comparative impotence without it.' '16
Until the early to mid-1800s, legislation in both England and the United
States imposed strict limits on an owner's ability to incorporate and enjoy the
benefits of limited liability.17 Prior to that time, incorporation typically re-
quired a special act of Parliament or a state legislature.18 State legislatures
enacting general corporation statutes usually imposed substantial limitations
on corporations, including minimum paid-in capital requirements, limited
permissible purposes, and limited duration.'9 As corporations began to dom-
inate the economic landscape, however, legislatures have removed nearly all
of the original limitations on the ability of corporations to organize and
operate.20
State legislatures grant limited liability to owners of corporations to bet-
ter facilitate business formation within that state. Just as Jacksonian liberals
argued in the 1800s that a state's failure to grant limited liability to corporate
owners would drive capital to other states,2 ' legislatures today enact various
modem liability-protective business codes, such as the currently popular lim-
14 See generally Lawrence E. Mitchell, Close Corporations Reconsidered, 63 TUL L. REv.
1143, 1147 n.10 (1989) (emphasizing that limited liability is the "major reason small business
persons choose to incorporate").
15 THOMAs COOPER, LEcTuREs ON THE ELEmars OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 247,250 (2d
ed. 1830), quoted in HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW 1836-1937 50
(1991) (internal quotation marks and footnote omitted).
16 MAURICE WORMSER, DIsREOARD OF Tm CORPORATE FICTION AND ALLID CoRPo.
RATION PROBLEMS 2-3 (1927), quoted in STEPHEN B. PRESSER, PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL
§ 1.01, at 1-5 (1996).
17 See Kenneth K. Luce, Trends in Modern Corporation Legislation, 50 MiCi. L. REv.
1291, 1293-94 (1952) (describing how "corporate charters were difficult and expensive to obtain,
the fruit of special privilege"); see also Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Develop-
ment of Corporate Theory, 88 W. VA. L. REv. 173, 208-09 (1985) ("It is not usually appreciated
that truly limited shareholder liability was far from the norm in America even as late as 1900.").
18 See HARRY G. HENN & JoHN R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER
BusINEss ENrrERPtusEs § 12, at 24-25 (3d ed. 1983).
19 See id. at 25-26.
20 See id. at 26-32.
21 See Roberta Romano, Competition for Corporate Charters and the Lesson of Takeover
[Vol 65:1
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ited liability company legislation, fearing that, without such enactment, eco-
nomic opportunities would shift to competing states.
So fundamental is limited liability to the basic objectives of the business
owner that, in 1980, the Treasury proposed regulations elevating limited lia-
bility to the dispositive factor in determining entity classification, 2  providing
that "the term 'partnership' can apply only to an organization some member
of which is personally liable under applicable local law for debts of the organ-
ization."23 The Treasury withdrew its proposed regulations in 1982 while
contemporaneously announcing the beginning of a study project to review
whether partnership taxation should be applied to entities in which no owner
is personally liable.24 The study concluded in 1988 with the issuance of the
Wyoming limited liability company revenue ruling,2 in which the Service
ruled that limited liability was simply one of four factors used to determine
entity classification and was no more or less important than any of the other
three factors.26 The Service concluded that a Wyoming limited liability com-
pany27 could be classified as a partnership for tax purposes even though no
owner was liable28 for any of the entity's debts.29
2. Capital Accumulation and the Evolution of Corporate Law
Following the Industrial Revolution, capital-intensive business required
substantial capital expenditures beyond the means of the typical shareholder/
employee, requiring the infusion of outside investment. 30 Granting limited
liability to those who contributed capital encouraged investment, because in-
vestors could invest without risking their full net worth. Although investors
may be willing to risk their entire net worth in businesses they themselves
operate, they are not willing-absent limited liability-to invest in businesses
that they do not operate or closely monitor. Limited liability enables venture
capitalists to invest in diverse enterprises without incurring the excessive
costs necessary to monitor each enterprise closely. 31
Statutes, 61 FoRDHAm L. REV. 843, 843-47 (1993) (summarizing the literature and the debate
regarding the competition among states for corporate business).
22 See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2, 45 Fed. Reg. 75,709 (1980).
23 See iL
24 See I.R.S. News Release IR-82-145 (Dec. 16, 1982); see also Louis F. Lobenhofer, Lim-
ited Liability Entities in Ohio: A Primer on the Limited Liability Company and Partnership with
Limited Liability, Their Substantive and Tax Aspects, 21 Omo N.U. L. REv. 39 (1994).
25 See Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360.
26 See id. at 361 (instructing that "equal weight must be given to each of the four corporate
characteristics of continuity of life, centralization of management, limited liability and free trans-
ferability of interests").
27 See Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-15-101 to -144 (Michie 1989 & Supp. 1996).
28 See id,
29 See Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360, 360-61. The entity lacked continuity of life and
free transferability of interest, two factors that suggest classification of a business entity as a
corporation for tax purposes. See id.; see also infra Part III.B2 (noting that whether a corpora-
tion is private or publicly traded is an important tax consideration).
30 See generally HOVENKAMP, supra note 15, at 49-55 (describing a postindustrial era shift
toward limited liability for shareholders calculated to facilitate infusion of capital into new
businesses).
31 See FRANK H. EAsTER.RoOK & DANIEL R. FiscHEL, Tm ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
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Limited liability enables owners to allocate risks and shift losses? 2 If a
creditor suffers a loss-including a loss occasioned by a corporation's tor-
tious conduct-the creditor has little practical recourse against an insolvent
corporation.
Some commentators suggest that less justification exists for granting lim-
ited liability to owners in closely held businesses.33 The primary justification
for limited liability of owners is that limited liability facilitates capital ac-
cumulation when ownership and management are separate 3 4 Ownership and
management are nearly identical in most close corporations and such owners/
managers are more likely to invest, without the benefit of limited liability,
when they participate in control. Courts, perhaps recognizing the lesser justi-
fication for protection of shareholders of closely held corporations from per-
sonal liability, apply the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil almost
exclusively to closely held corporations.3 5
Corporate law, while securing limited liability, provides that corporate
power must be exercised according to certain mandatory rules, which "gov-
ern defined issues in a manner that cannot be varied by corporate actors. '36
For example, all corporations presumptively must have a central governance
group embodying the board of directors.3 7 Corporate law requires share-
CORPORATE LAW 41-42 (1991) (reasoning that limited liability encourages investor diversifica-
tion and discourages close monitoring of each individual investment).
32 See HovENKAMP, supra note 15, at 53 (noting that the risk of liability is allocated among
investors, limited to the amount of each investor's capital input, and that limited liability shifts a
portion of the risk of loss to creditors).
33 See, e.g., Paul Halpern et al., An Economic Analysis of Limited Liability in Corporation
Law, 30 U. TORONTO L.J. 117, 148 (1980) (arguing that "a limited liability regime will, in many
cases, create incentives for owners to exploit a moral hazard and transfer uncompensated busi-
ness risks to creditors, thus inducing costly attempts by creditors to reduce these risks"); Henry
Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Liability for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J.
1879, 1882 (1991) (relating that "[t]he most familiar inefficiency created by limited liability is the
incentive it provides for the shareholder to direct the [closely held] corporation to spend too
little on precautions to avoid accidents").
34 See Halpern, supra note 33, at 125 (discussing financial literature theorizing that an
unlimited liability scheme encourages owners to monitor management's actions, thereby increas-
ing corporate transaction costs and decreasing the attractiveness of the investment).
35 See 1 F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 1.10, at 1-
46 (3d ed. 1994) (describing an empirical study revealing that virtually all instances in which
courts pierced the corporate veil involved close corporations). A corporation is regarded as a
legal entity independent of its owners. See id. "Piercing the corporate veil" is a judicial doctrine
which allows a court to disregard the separate corporate entity and hold owners liable for the
debts of the corporation. See id. Courts often opine that the corporate veil will be pierced only
in unusual circumstances: "whenever the separateness of the corporate form is employed to
evade an existing obligation, circumvent a statute, perpetuate fraud or crime or generally com-
mit an injustice or gain an unfair advantage." Id. § 1.10, at 1-47. While courts apparently do not
pierce the corporate veil to shareholders of publicly held corporations, an empirical study dis-
closed that the corporate veil was pierced in 40% of reported cases involving closely held corpo-
rations. See id.
36 Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. L. Rnv. 1461,
1461 (1989) (internal footnote omitted).
37 See DEL_ CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1991) (board of directors required unless other-
wise provided in certificate of incorporation); REVISED MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT § 8.01 (1984)
(amended 1996) (board of directors required unless all shareholders agree to a nontraditional
form of governance); id. § 8.03 (number and election of directors).
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holders to elect the board of directors through regularly scheduled annual
elections38 or special elections.3 9 In order to provide some accountability,
perpetual directorships are often banned4 and fiduciary duties of directors
and management are mandatory.41
Professor Bernard Black suggests that these and other mandatory as-
pects of corporate law are, for the most part, "trivial," 42 arguing that inves-
tors and managers can (with the requisite legal assistance)43 "establish[ ] any
set of governance rules they want."44 Therefore, "the mandatory/enabling
balance.., isn't really there."45 Corporate law may be entirely enabling to
the extent that many mandatory rules "are either avoidable or have no
bite. '46 In any event, corporate law also provides "suppletory rules" to facili-
tate the joining of relatively passive investors with active managers.47
In any event, current corporate codes do provide for limited liability and
a structure of governance between and among the shareholders (owners) and
the directors and officers (managers). The legal principle of limited liability
has given investors assurance of a definite and certain investment risk.48
Thus, granting limited liability to corporations advances economic policies by
encouraging business activity in general.49
38 See, eg., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(b) ("An annual meeting of stockholders shall be
held for the election of directors on a date and at a time designated by or in the manner provided
in the bylaws."); REVISED MODEL Bus. COR'. Acr § 7.01(a) ("A corporation shall hold a meet-
ing of shareholders annually at a time stated in or fixed in accordance with the bylaws.").
39 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(d) (special meetings may be called by board or
according to bylaws); REVISED MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT § 7.02 (special meetings may be called
by board, by 10% of shareholder votes, or according to bylaws).
40 See EASTERBROOK & FiscmEL, supra note 31, at 3 (noting that "[s]tates almost uni-
formly forbid perpetual directorships").
41 Professor Gordon enumerates Delaware's mandatory rules. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, The
Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1549, 1553-54 n.16 (1989). But cf.
Roberta Romano, Answering the Wrong Question: The Tenuous Case for Mandatory Corporate
Laws, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1599,1599-1602,1616 (1989) (contesting Professor Gordon in part and
arguing that although many "mandatory" rules may be avoided, some may be desirable "when
externalities are present").
42 See Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Economic Analysis, 84
Nw. U. L. REv. 542, 544 (1990) (suggesting a "triviality hypothesis" where "appearances notwith-
standing, state corporate law is trivial" and "what is left of state corporate law is an empty shell
that has form but no content").
43 Black suggests that instead of black-letter corporate law, "we [law professors] teach
corporate law courses where the central themes include how complex organizations are struc-
tured, and how corporate law and planning by corporate lawyers can facilitate those structures."
Id. at 593. Accordingly, Black appears to argue that "clever lawyers" are able to go beyond the
black-letter to facilitate their clients' needs. See id.
44 Id. at 544.
45 Id. at 551.
46 Id.
47 See JAMES W. HuRsT, Tim LEGrnMACY OF THE BustNEss CORPORATION IN THE LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES, 1780-1970 159 (1990) (arguing that "we must not exaggerate the role of
corporation law in mobilizing capital for the large enterprise").
48 The limits of limited liability are expressed primarily by the "piercing the corporate
veil" doctrine. See WORMSER, supra note 16.
49 See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 33, at 1879 (observing that limited liability
"create[s] incentives for excessive risk-taking by permitting corporations to avoid the full costs of
their activities"); David XV. Leebron, Limited Liability, Tort Victims, and Creditors, 91 COLUM. L.
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B. Double Taxation as the Evil Non Plus Ultra
[P]olicymakers have allowed the tax tail to wag the economic dog.50
Congress is creating an increasing number of separate tax molds,
each with its particular quirks, each having certain advantages and
disadvantages, and each suggesting a different haven into which
confused taxpayers may rush for solace.51
The underlying policy issue involved with regard to entity classification
centers on whether business entities should be treated as separate legal per-
sons and taxed as separate entities or should be permitted pass-through treat-
ment. Another issue is whether taxation should otherwise be "integrated"
such that income will be taxed at only one level. Policymakers must decide
which businesses are to be subject to separate-or double- taxation in addi-
tion to the taxation of their owners.
Classifying an entity for tax purposes as either a partnership or a corpo-
ration is of central importance to choice-of-entity concerns: generally corpo-
rations are subject to entity-level taxation while partnerships are entitled to
pass-through treatment.52 Since its inception, the Internal Revenue Code
("Code") has imposed a two-tier structure of taxation on corporations53
while treating partnerships, even prior to the enactment of Subchapter K in
195454 as mere aggregations of their partners not separately taxable as a
business entity.55
Under this treatment, partnership income is attributed to the partners
and not the partnership. Thus, the partnership itself is not subject to tax.56
Similarly, losses and tax credits also pass through to the partnerss7 even in the
REv. 1565, 1566 (1991) (describing "the traditional corporate and economic justifications for
limited liability" as "the need to encourage investment in productive, albeit risky, activities").
50 Daniel S. Goldberg, The Tax Treatment of Limited Liability Companies: Law in Search
of Policy, 50 Bus. LAw. 995, 1017 (1995).
51 Mortimer M. Caplin, Income Tax Pressures on the Form of Business Organization: Is It
Time For a "Doing Business" Tax?, 47 VA. L. REv. 249, 249 (1961) (Mr. Caplin was a former
Commissioner of the Service).
52 See ROBERT W. HAMILTON, FUNDAMENTALS OF MODERN BusINEss 294 (1989).
53 See BoRIus I. BrrTIER & JAms S. EusrncE, Tim FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF COR-
PORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 1 1.01, at 1-2 to -5 (6th ed. 1994); JAMES S. EUSTCE ET AL.,
THm TAx REFORM Acr OF 1986: ANALYSIS AND COMMENTARY 2.02 (1987) (discussing history
of corporate tax rates); Robert Charles Clark, The Morphogenesis of Subchapter C: An Essay in
Statutory Evolution and Reform, 87 YALE L.J. 90, 90-94 (1977) (discussing the development of
the corporate tax culture and proposing a reform package); Marjorie E. Komhauser, Corporate
Regulation and the Origins of the Corporate Income Tax, 66 IND. Li. 53,53-55 (1990) (discussing
the development and significance of the corporate excise tax).
54 See Act of Aug. 16, 1954, ch. 736, 68A Stat. 250 (revising the internal revenue laws of
the United States).
55 See HAMILTON, supra note 52, at 294 ("Partnerships ... are not treated as separate
taxable entities."); Kimberly K. Francev, The Fate of the Fully-Divested Lower-Tier Partnership:
Does the IRS Recognize the Body?, 6 DEPAUL Bus. LJ. 201, 202-07 (1994) (concluding that
"partners [are] liable for income tax only in their separate or individual capacities"); Donald J.
Weidner, A Perspective to Reconsider Partnership Law, 16 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1, 4-10 (1988)
(comparing the entity versus the aggregate approach to partnership taxation).
56 See I.R.C. § 701 (1994).
57 See id. § 702.
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absence of partnership income or tax on that income.58 In contrast, a corpo-
ration, other than one electing S corporation status, is subject to double taxa-
tion: it is taxed once as an entity59 and, generally, its shareholders are taxed
on distributions of dividends which are treated as ordinary income.60 More-
over, because corporate losses do not pass through to the shareholders, such
losses cannot be used to offset the shareholders' other income.61
1. Entity Level Tax: The Dreaded Double Tax
The underlying problem is that Congress has failed to articulate any
clear rationale for the double-tax system .... The unfairness and
nonneutrality of the current rules produce drastic differences in tax-
ation based on relatively minor organizational distinctions.62
The Code subjects the net profits of most corporations to a two-tier
tax:63 a corporation's annual net profits are taxed at the corporate level64
while earnings distributed to shareholders are taxed again as ordinary income
at shareholders' personal rates.65 Retained earnings escape double taxation
only temporarily: the profits generated by these retained earnings are taxed
at the corporate level.66 Moreover, these earnings are taxed again at the
shareholder level either when they are distributed or when the shares are
sold by a shareholder.67
Arguably, the corporate tax imposes "efficiency losses."6 Some of these
losses occur because the tax is effective: by lowering the return to corporate
58 The limitation on the use of passive activity losses and credits under Code § 469 is ap-
plied at the partner level. See id. § 469, amended by SBJPA of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188,
§ 1704(d)(1), (e)(1), 110 Stat. 1755, 1878-79.
59 See id. § 11.
60 See id. § 61(a)(7) ("[G]ross income means all income from whatever source derived,
including... dividends .... ).
61 See ALVIN C. WARREN, JR., ArmRicAN LAW INsT., INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL
AND CORPORATE INCOME TAxEs: REPORTER'S STUDY OF CORPORATE INCOME TAx INTEGRA-
TION 1-12 (1993).
62 Karen C. Burke, The Uncertain Future of Limited Liability Companies, 12 AM. J. TAX
POL'Y 13, 47 (1995) (internal citation omitted).
63 See I.R.C. §§ 301-381 (Subchapter C) (imposing a double tax on corporations), amended
by ICC Termination Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-88, § 304(c), 109 Stat. 803, 944, and amended
by SBJPA of 1996 § 1702(h)(7), 110 Stat. at 1874; cf id, §§ 1361-1375 (Subchapter S) (imposing a
single tax on certain closely held corporations), amended by SBJPA of 1996, Pub. L No. 104-188,
110 Stat. 1755.
64 See id. § 11.
65 See i. § 1, amended by SBJPA of 1996 § 1704(m)(1), (2)(A)-(B), 110 Stat. at 1882-83;
id. §61(a)(7).
66 See WARREN, JR., supra note 61, at 1-12.
67 See i.
68 See id. at 21-46 (summarizing defects of double tax); George F. Break, Corporate Tax
Integration: Radical Revisionism or Common Sense?, in FEDERAL TAx REFORm: MYTHs AND
REALriEs 55, 60-63 (Michael J. Boskin ed., 1978) ("Both present and future generations are
affected in important ways by the economic distortions created by a separate corporation income
tax."); Alvin Warren, The Relation and Integration of Individual and Corporate Income Taxes, 94
HARv. L. REv. 717,721-38 (1981) (discussing the relationship between individual and corporate
taxation).
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capital69 the corporate tax discourages investment in the corporate sector.70
One commentator suggests that "[t]his may reduce efficiency by lowering
output in industries that find a corporate form of organization particularly
suitable." 71
Integration by way of pass-through taxation might eliminate many
of the problems created by double taxation.72 Even though inte-
gration has achieved the support of scholars, professional groups,73
various Treasury reports,74  presidential administrations, 75  and nu-
69 No consensus exists as to who bears the ultimate burden of a corporate tax. Although
initially the burden of the corporate tax falls on corporate shareholders, the tax burden may
shift, in part or in whole, from corporate shareholders to others, such as labor, firm customers, or
capital generally. See Thomas D. Griffith, Integration of the Corporate and Personal Income
Taxes and the ALl Proposals, 23 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 715, 724-31 (1983) (concluding that
theoretical and empirical literature favors the hypothesis that, at least in the short run, corporate
shareholders bear the burden of double taxation); Arnold C. Harberger, The Incidence of the
Corporation Income Tax, 70 J. PoL. ECON. 215,215-17 (1962). Compare MARIAN KRZYZANiAK
& RICHARD A. MUSORAVE, THm SHIFTING OF THE CORPORATION INCOME TAX: AN EMPIRICAL
STUDY OF ITS SHORT-RUN EFFCr UPON Trm RATE OF RETURN 1-66 (1963) (comparing theo-
retical corporate income tax arguments with the results of empirical study), with John K. Mc-
Nulty, Corporate Income Tax Reform in the United States: Proposals for Integration of the
Corporate and Individual Income Taxes, and International Aspects, 12 INT'L TAX & Bus. LAW.
161, 257-59 (1994) (discussing controversy over who bears burden of corporate tax).
70 See, e.g., DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, REPORT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE
TREASURY ON INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND CORPORATE TAX SYSTEMS: TAXING
BusINEss INCOME ONCE 125-28 (1992) [hereinafter TREASURY REPORT]; WARREN, JR., supra
note 61, at 22-28 (concluding that the corporate rate structure creates a disincentive to invest in
new corporate stock).
71 Jennifer Arlen & Deborah M. Weiss, A Political Theory of Corporate Taxation, 105
YALE L.J. 325,329 (1995) (internal footnotes omitted) (citing WARREN, JR., supra note 61, at 25-
28; TREASURY REPORT, supra note 70, at 115-16).
72 See, eg., William A. Klein, Income Taxation and Legal Entities, 20 UCLA L. REV. 13,
43-57, 73-74 (1972) (discussing the adverse effects of double taxation on the corporate entity and
advocating pass-through taxation for corporations). Some scholars, however, defend a corpo-
rate-level tax. See Hideki Kanda & Saul Levmore, Taxes, Agency Costs, and the Price of Incor-
poration, 77 VA. L. REV. 211,229-37 (1991) (defending double taxation of corporations based on
"agency cost considerations"); Edward J. McCaffery, Cognitive Theory and Tax, 41 UCLA L.
REV. 1861, 1883-86 (1994) ("Cognitive theory... helps to explain at least the political appeal of
the corporate income tax.").
73 See WILLIAM D. ANDREWS, AMERICAN LAW INST., SUBCHAPTER C: PROPOSALS ON
CORPORATE ACOUIsmiONS AND REPORTER'S STUDY ON CORPORATE DISTRIBUTIONS 356-400,
514 (1982).
74 See DAVID F. BRADFORD & U.S. TREASURY TAX PoLicY STAFF, BLUEPRINTS FOR BA-
SIC TAX REFORM 4-5, 171 (2d ed. 1984) (revised edition of 1977 Treasury Report) (endorsing full
corporate integration whereby corporations would not be subject to tax but "shareholders would
be taxable on their prorata share of corporate income"); 2 DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY,
TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 136-37 (1984) (proposing
dividend deduction system).
75 Treasury Secretary William Simon proposed corporate tax integration under the Ford
Administration. See Tax Reform: Public Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means,
94th Cong. 3857-58 (1975) (testimony of William Simon, Secretary of the Treasury). The propo-
sal appeared again in Tax Reform Act of 1975: Hearings on H.R. 10612 Before the Senate Comm.
on Finance, 94th Cong. 70-77 (1976) (testimony of William Simon, Secretary of the Treasury).
Both the Carter and Reagan administrations considered integration. See JOHN F. WrrrIE, THE
POLrCs AND DEVELOPMENT OF ra-m FEDERAL INCOME TAX 204-05 (1985) (discussing Carter
administration's proposal of a comprehensive tax reform package for integration of individual
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merous members of both houses of Congress, 76 the double tax per-
sists.
Some scholars suggest that the double tax persists because the public
supports it77 in as much as the public views corporations as distinct entities
subject to taxation like any individual.78 Other commentators argue "that the
corporate tax persists because it serves congressional objectives. '79 In any
event, the focus typically has not been on elimination of the entity or double
tax but rather on the determination of which business organizations will be
subject to it.
2. The Kintner Four-Factor Test
Incorporated businesses are presumptively taxed as entities separate
from their owners. Other forms of business organization may be taxed sepa-
rately or not, depending on the organizational characteristics of the particular
business. Under current Treasury Regulations, four attributes, or character-
istics, distinguish businesses treated as partnerships for federal income tax
purposes from businesses treated as associations taxable as corporations.
These attributes, known as the Kintner factors,80 are (i) continuity of life; (ii)
centralized management; (ii) limited liability; and (iv) free transferability of
and corporate income taxes); Norman Jonas, That Wasn't Really a Gaffe on Corporate Taxes,
Bus. WK., Feb. 14, 1983, at 38 (discussing the possibility of Reagan administration "sharply re-
ducing, revising, or even abolishing" the corporate tax).
76 In 1978, Representative Al Ullman introduced legislation that would have partially inte-
grated the corporate tax. See 124 CONG. RFc. 2132-34 (1978) (proposal of Rep. Ullman repre-
senting "a start toward eliminating the double taxation of dividends"); id. at 7978-80 (statement
of Rep. Uliman). The litany of other bills advocating integration include S. 1700, 103d Cong.
(1993) (Sen. Simon); H.R. 948, 103d Cong. (1993) (Rep. Regula); H.R. 669, 103d Cong. (1993)
(Rep. Dornan); S. 3102, 102d Cong. (1992) (Sen. Simon); H.R. 663, 102d Cong. (1991) (Rep.
Dornan); H.R. 4707, 101st Cong. (1990) (Rep. Campbell); H.R. 4457, 101st Cong. (1990) (Rep.
Vander Jagt); S. 1161, 101st Cong. (1989) (Sen. Shelby); H.R. 1052, 101st Cong. (1989) (Rep.
Doman); H.R. 3668, 100th Cong. (1987) (Rep. Doman); H.R. 6436, 98th Cong. (1984) (Rep.
Shannon); H.R. 1445, 97th Cong. (1981) (Rep. Sawyer).
77 See Daniel Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice and Public Interest" A Study of the Legislative
Process as Illustrated by Tax Legislation in the 1980s, 139 U. PA. L. RExv. 1, 60-61 (1990) ("While
public opinion does not support a high degree of progressivity, it holds that wealthy individuals
should pay their 'fair share' of tax."); see also Barry E. Adler, Financial and Political Theories of
American Corporate Bankruptcy, 45 STAN. L. REv. 311, 345-46 (1993) (suggesting that the con-
nection between corporations and voters is "too attenuated" to engender opposition to the cor-
porate income tax).
78 The entity theory was the original basis for imposing a separate corporate tax. See
MERVYN KING, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE CORPORATION 50 (1977) (discussing "the concept of
separate taxation of the company and its shareholders").
79 Arlen & Weiss, supra note 71, at 332. "The most common variation on this theme is the
'hidden tax' argument: The corporate tax is a politically expedient way of raising revenue be-
cause the public does not understand that it ultimately bears the burden of the tax." Id. (foot-
note omitted).
80 See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(1) (1995). The regulations are known as Kintner regula-
tions because they were enacted in response to a United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit decision holding that an association's tax status was determined by its corporate charac-
teristics. See infra notes 86-94 and accompanying text.
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interests.81 In order to be classified as a partnership or a limited liability
company the entity must lack at least two of these characteristics.82
This four factor test originated in Morrissey v. Commissioner,83 which
involved the federal income tax classification of an organization formed as a
trust under state law. The Supreme Court in Morrissey emphasized the
trust's freely transferable "share certificates," and ruled that the trust resem-
bled a corporation and therefore should be classified as an association taxa-
ble as a corporation.84 The Court based its decision on the various
characteristics that distinguish associations taxable as corporations from
trusts and partnerships, hinging tax classification on the structural and opera-
tional resemblance of the subject entity rather than on any policy goal that
might be achieved by the classification. 85
In United States v. Kintner,86 a physician formed an association of physi-
cians under the rubric of a general partnership, seeking association classifica-
tion taxable as a corporation, thus enabling the organization to establish a
qualified corporate pension plan for the benefit of its employees. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found for the taxpayer, holding
the organization had sufficient corporate characteristics to qualify as an asso-
ciation taxable as a corporation and thereby able to avail itself of the benefits
of corporate pension tax law.87
The Treasury responded to Kintner by proposing new regulations in
195988 that were modified and adopted in 1960 as final regulations.8 9 The
1960 Kintner regulations, which are basically the current regulations, at-
tempted to prevent noncorporate entities from obtaining the pension plan
advantages of corporations.90 The limitation particularly affected profession-
81 See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(1). Free transferability of interests exists if each of the
owners of the organization-or those owners owning "substantially all" of the interests-has the
power, without the consent of other owners, to transfer the ownership interest in a manner that
substitutes the transferee for the owner. See id. § 301.7701-2(e)(1). Such consent may take the
form of consent by a majority of owners or consent by a particular owner. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 93-
92, 1993-2 C.B. 318, 320-21 (concluding that an Oklahoma limited liability company lacked free
transferability of interests because transfer required the consent of a majority of the remaining
capital interests). The regulations make clear that free transferability of interests exists only
when it is possible to transfer all the rights of the interest owner. See. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-
2(e). If the owner may freely transfer only economic rights, free transferability is not present.
See id. Revenue Procedure 95-10 follows this division by stating that the Service will generally
rule that free transferability of interests is lacking when a member does not have the power to
transfer "all the attributes" of the member's interest without consent. See Rev. Proc. 95-10
§ 5.02(2), 1995-1 C.B. 501, 504.
82 See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(3).
83 296 U.S. 344, 345, 359-60 (1935).
84 See id. at 360.
85 See id. at 360-61.
86 216 F.2d 418, 418-19 (9th Cir. 1954).
87 See id. at 428.
88 See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701, 24 Fed. Reg. 10,450 (1959) (distinguishing partnerships
from corporations).
89 T.D. 6503, 1960-2 C.B. 409-25.
90 See Victor E. Fleischer, "If It Looks Like a Duck". Corporate Resemblance and Check-
the-Box Elective Tax Classification, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 518, 526 (1996) ("The Treasury re-
sponded to Kintner in 1960 by promulgating new entity classification regulations... designed to
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als who, at the time of Kintner, were unable to incorporate under state corpo-
rate laws.91 The regulations sought to accomplish this result by shifting the
regulatory bias toward partnership classification.92
Despite the importance of entity-level taxation, the four factor Kintner
test fails to express any clear policy objective. That is, the Treasury made no
attempt-other than precluding professional associations from qualifying as
corporations and obtaining retirement tax benefits available only to corpora-
tions-to accomplish a coherent policy objective.93 Consequently, although
many ruminations and considerations intervened, the Kintner test remains
basically the same today.94 It is this four-factor corporate characteristic test
that drives the formation of business entities today and fuels the adoption of
new business organization laws that strive to limit liability and eliminate
double taxation.
II. Failed Efforts to Resolve the Limited Liability/Double-Tax
Dilemma: Law in Search of Policy
The tensions and trade-offs inherent in the quest to achieve limited lia-
bility without double taxation have fueled the creation of numerous hybrids
of the polar models of the corporation and the general partnership. These
hybrid entities more or less form a continuum between the pure general part-
nership and the pure corporation in an attempt to create the ideal form of
business organization. Although we highlight only the main forms of such
alternative entities, the potential variations based on combination of forms
and affiliate ownership is limited only by the creativity and risk adversity of
the crafter.
A. S Corporations
Congress adopted Subchapter S to address the double-tax/limited liabil-
ity dilemma by affording certain corporations partnership-like tax treat-
ment.95 Congress also believed that Subchapter S would simplify the tax law
by reducing its impact on the choice of business form. 96 Although corpora-
tions electing taxation under Subchapter S are taxed as pass-through enti-
ties,97 S corporation status restricts the number and identity of permissible
make it more difficult to achieve association status."); Stephen B. Scallen, Federal Income Taxa-
tion of Professional Associations and Corporations, 49 MN. L. REv. 603, 605 (1965) (discussing
how the Kintner regulations foreclosed ability of professional partnerships to be treated as as-
sociations for federal tax purposes).
91 See Scallen, supra note 90, at 605.
92 SeeMU
93 See Fleischer, supra note 90, at 526.
94 See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701, 24 Fed. Reg. 10,450 (1959).
95 See S. REP. No. 85-1983, at § 68 (1958), reprinted in 1958-3 C.B. 922, 1008-09. In Au-
gust 1996, the SBJPA of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, 110 Stat. 1755 (to be codified in scattered
sections of 26 U.S.C.), became law. The SBJPA of 1996 is effective beginning January 1, 1997.
See id
96 See Susan Kalinka, The Limited Liability Company and Subchapter S: Classification Is-
sues Revisited, 60 U. CN. L. Rav. 1083, 1086-87 (1992).
97 See I.R.C. §§ 1361-1378 (1994), amended by SBJPA of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, 110
Stat. 1755.
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shareholders98 and imposes a "one class of stock" ownership requirement.99
The resulting regulations thus restrict the availability of conduit taxation by
adding another level of relatively arbitrary organizational attributes that a
business must meet to satisfy the Subchapter S criteria.1°° Nevertheless, the
S corporation remains the primary corporate-styled analog to partnerships
and limited liability companies.' 0 l In addition to the criteria limiting its ap-
plication, there are situations in which S corporations face significant tax dis-
advantages when compared to partnerships, including taxation of certain in-
kind distributions, the inability to adjust the inside basis, and taxation of
some contributions to the business. 1°2
Senators Danforth and Pryor, members of the Senate Finance Commit-
tee, introduced legislation in 1993 that would remove many of the eligibility
98 See id. § 1361(b)(1)(A)-(C), amended by SBJPA of 1996 §§ 1301, 1316(a)(1), 110 Stat.
1777, 1785-86. Prior to enactment of the SBJPA of 1996, in order to qualify for S corporation tax
treatment, a corporation could not have more than 35 shareholders. See id. § 1361(b)(1)(A),
amended by SBJPA of 1996 § 1301, 110 Stat. at 1777. The SBJPA of 1996 increases the maxi-
mum number of eligible shareholders from 35 to 75. See SBJPA of 1996 § 1301, 110 Stat. at 1777
(effective Jan. 1, 1997). An S corporation may not have a shareholder-other than a trust-who
is not an individual. See I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1)(B), amended by SBJPA of 1996 § 1316(a)(1), 110
Stat. at 1785-86. Similarly, the corporation may not have owners who are nonresident aliens.
See id. § 1361(b)(1)(C). This limitation poses significant barriers for offshore joint ventures.
99 See I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1)(D). S corporations may not be members of affiliated groups
and may not have more than one class of stock. See id. § 1361(b)(1)(D), (2)(A), amended by
SBJPA of 1996 § 1308(a), 110 Stat. at 1782. The restrictions limit estate planning options. With
S corporations, it is impossible to create two classes of stock having different management and
dividend rights for parent and child. See id. § 1361(b)(1)(D). The restrictions also cause
problems when investors contribute different types of assets or have different investment expec-
tations. See id. (S corporations restricted to one class of stock). For example, with S corpora-
tions it is impossible to create one class of stock paying fixed high dividends and another class of
stock paying low dividends but enjoying capital appreciation. See id.; Richard L. Parker, Corpo-
rate Benefits Without Corporate Taxation: Limited Liability Company and Limited Partnership
Solutions to the Choice of Entity Dilemma, 29 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 399, 421 n.103 (1992).
100 See Parker, supra note 99, at 421 n.103.
101 On the one hand, taxpayers currently can use S corporations to avoid the corporate-
level tax on operating profits; on the other hand, limited liability companies theoretically offer
heightened flexibility in accomplishing a more complicated economic sharing arrangement
among equity owners than a straight pro rata sharing. Whereas S corporations can only issue a
single class of stock, see I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1)(D), limited liability company members can share
profits, losses, and distributions in the same, more complex manner as partners can share such
partnership items. See id. § 734(b) (method of adjustment); id. § 743(b) (adjustment to basis of
partnership property); id. § 754 (manner of electing optional adjustment to basis of partnership
property). In addition, partnership tax treatment is generally preferential to S corporation tax
treatment. See Parker, supra note 99, at 422-29. For example, partnership tax treatment permits
more generous loss pass-through by including entity level debt in the partners' outside basis. See
id. at 427-28. Also, S corporations, under current tax law, sometimes involve double-level tax
resulting from shareholder transactions. See id. at 423. In contrast, partnership taxation treat-
ment applicable to limited liability companies allows for avoidance of these problems. See I.R.C.
§ 734(b) (method of adjustment); id. § 743(b) (adjustment to basis of partnership property); id.
§ 754 (manner of electing optional adjustment to basis of partnership property).
102 See Parker, supra note 99, at 422-29. Professor Parker describes these disadvantages in
detail and concludes: "Beyond the fact that subchapter S may not be available to or practical for
every business, it should also be noted that taxation under subchapter S may, in certain situa-
tions, be significantly greater than the taxation that would have been imposed had a partnership
been utilized." Id. at 422 (citation omitted).
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requirements contained in Subchapter S,103 and increase the number of per-
missible shareholders from thirty-five to fifty.104 The S corporation would
also be permitted to issue convertible debt and preferred stock,105 though
such stock could not be participating, could not have redemption and liquida-
tion rights exceeding its issue price, and could not be convertible. 06 The
proposal would allow an S corporation to own eighty percent or more of the
stock of another corporation' 0 7 and would expand the types of trusts that can
own S corporation stock while easing some of the pitfalls caused by invalid
elections and inadvertent terminations. 08 Moreover, it would apply C corpo-
ration rules for fringe benefit purposes' °9 and eliminate the requirement of
maintaining an AAA account for pre-1983 earnings and profits."10
On August 20, 1996, President Clinton signed into law the Small Busi-
ness Job Protection Act of 1996 ("SBJPA of 1996"),"' that, among other
things, increases the maximum number of eligible shareholders from thirty to
seventy-five, 112 allows S corporation stock to be held by "electing small busi-
ness trusts,"1" 3 and allows S corporations to own eighty percent or more of a
C corporation."14 Although an improvement, these changes leave untouched
the basic problems. First, while expanding the potential applicability of Sub-
chapter S, the changes do not minimize, but rather change, the complexity of
tax law as applied to these businesses. Second, simplification is lost because
the tax consequences of operating a business under Subchapter S for corpo-
rations and Subchapter K for partnerships would still differ. More funda-
103 See S Corporation Reform Act of 1993, S. 1690, 103d Cong. (1994). Senators Pryor and
Danforth. introduced the bill on November 11, 1993; the bill was not acted upon in the 103d
Congress. On May 4,1995, Senators Pryor and Hatch introduced the S Corporation Reform Act
of 1995, S. 758, 104th Cong. (1995), and enjoyed its first hearing on June 19, 1995, before the
Senate Finance Committee's Taxation Subcommittee. See The S Corporation Reform Act of
1995: Hearings on S. 758 Before the Subcomm. on Taxation and LR.S. Oversight of the Comm. on
Finance, 104th Cong. 3 (1995); Present Law and Proposals Relating to Subchapter S Corporations
and Home Office Deductions: Schedule for a Hearing on S. 758 Before the Subcomm. on Taxation
and LR.S. Oversight of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 104th Cong. 1 (1995).
104 See S. 1690 § 101. Moreover, under the proposed legislation, all members of a single
family would count as just one shareholder. See id. § 102. Tax exempt organizations, financial
institutions, and nonresident aliens would be permitted to own corporation stock as well. See id.
§§ 111-113.
105 See id. § 201.
106 See id, Unfortunately, the preferred stock allowed by proposed legislation regarding
Code § 1361(c)(7)(B) would be required to have the worst attributes of both common stock and
debt: as stock, it would fall behind all debt in bankruptcy; as nonparticipating and nonconvert-
ible, it would lack the speculative charm of common stock. Indeed, such stock cannot even pay a
premium on a redemption or liquidation. See ida
107 See id. § 221. The proposal would not, however, permit the related entities to file a
consolidated return. See id.
108 See id. 33 114, 211.
109 See id. § 222.
110 See id. § 226.
111 Pub. L. No. 104-188, 110 Stat. 1755 (to be codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
Sections 1301 to 1317 of the SBJPA of 1996 amended the Subehapter S rules. See id. §§ 1301-
1317, 110 Stat. at 1777-87.
112 See id. § 1301, 110 Stat. at 1777.
113 Id. § 1302, 110 Stat. at 1777.
114 See id. § 1308, 110 Stat. 1782-83.
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mentally, business owners would still be encouraged implicitly to use the
entity classification that would produce the lowest tax bill, regardless of
whether or not that entity provided the optimal organizational structure for
the business." 5
B. Limited Partnerships and Master Limited Partnerships
New York ushered in the first limited partnership statute in 1822116 and
soon thereafter jurisdictions began adopting this business form. In 1916, the
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws drafted the Uniform Limited Part-
nership Act which was subsequently enacted by every state." 7 In 1976, the
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws approved a Revised Uniform Lim-
ited Partnership Act that most jurisdictions have adopted." 8
Generally, a limited partnership is treated as a partnership under the tax
law if at least two of the four corporate characteristic criteria are not pres-
ent." 9 This treatment persists even though limited partners can exercise only
limited control over the partnership and exercise no day-to-day control over
the partnership's business. 120
The Kintner regulations catalyzed the emergence of "master limited
partnerships," which are large, syndicated tax-shelter limited partnerships 121
in which the equity participants enjoyed limited liability.122 The limited part-
nerships generally obtained favorable pass-through treatment of income,
gains, and losses by avoiding association classification under the new regula-
tions.'23 The regulations designed to restrain access to corporate pension
plan advantages, therefore, unwittingly enabled even a large, publicly traded,
115 In addition, the eligibility requirements would continue to be different. Some investors
who would otherwise prefer the corporate form would be forced to adopt a partnership or lim-
ited liability company structure in order to obtain the desired tax consequences.
116 See Act of Apr. 17, 1822, ch. 244, 1822 N.Y. Laws 259.
117 See R. Kurt Wilke, Note, Limited Partnership Control: A Reexamination of Creditor
Reliance, 60 IND. L.J. 515, 518 (1985).
118 See Deborah A. DeMott, Our Partners' Keepers? Agency Dimensions of Partnership
Relationships, in 58 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS: PARTNERSHIPS 109,115 (Deborah A.
DeMott & J. Dennis Hynes eds., 1995); Symposium, Limited Partnership Act, 9 ST. MARY'S LJ.
441, 441 (1978).
119 See Larson v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 159, 185-86 (1976), acq., 1979-2 C.B. 2; Treas. Reg.
§ 301.7701-2(a)(3), -3(b)(1) (1995). In Larson, the court held that an entity organized as a lim-
ited partnership that possessed the corporate characteristics of centralized management and free
transferability of interests, but lacked continuity of life and limited liability, was taxable as a
partnership. See Larson, 66 T.C. at 185-86.
120 See REVISED UNr. LTD. PARTNERSHIP Acr § 303 (amended 1985), 6A U.L.A. 144-45
(1995). A limited partner's relationship to the partnership mirrors a shareholder's relationship
to a corporation. See id. During the 1970s and 1980s, limited partnerships became the principal
vehicle for tax shelter investors. See Richard A. Booth, Profit-Seeking, Individual Liability, and
the Idea of the Firm, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 539, 546 (1995).
121 For a discussion of the creation of the limited partnership association, see Schwartz,
supra note 9, at 29-64.
122 As to the limited liability of the large limited partnership, see REVIsED UNnF. LTD.
PARTNERSHIP Acr § 303, 6A U.L.A. 144-45.
123 See Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-2(a)(3), -3(b)(1).
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noncorporate entity formed as a limited partnership under state law to qual-
ify as a partnership for federal tax purposes.124
Fearing unrestrained growth of tax-shelter limited partnerships, the
Treasury modified again its regulations in 1977, retaining the corporate classi-
fication approach based upon factors of resemblance while adding certain
secondary corporate characteristics against which the entity would have to be
evaluated. 25 The Treasury, however, withdrew these regulations, 126 and, in
1980, issued proposed regulations that treated unlimited liability as a neces-
sary, but not sufficient, condition for partnership classification. 127 The Treas-
ury eventually withdrew these proposed regulations in 1982.128 Following
withdrawal of these regulations, the Service shifted emphasis to minimum
capitalization requirements, which had been set forth in Revenue Procedure
72-13129 and were reiterated in Revenue Procedure 89-12.13o
Congress finally addressed the problem in 1987 with the enactment of
Code § 7704.131 Congress sought to restrain the proliferation of publicly
traded limited partnerships as a means of increasing the number of investors
eligible to benefit from pass-through tax treatment of business entities.132
Section 7704 reclassified most publicly traded limited partnerships as corpo-
rations for tax purposes.133 The life and death saga of the master limited
partnership provides a classic example of the intrinsic dangers and frailty of a
Treasury- and Service-dictated organizational regime: with one pen stroke
the Treasury and the Service all but killed the master limited partnership.
C. Limited Liability Partnerships
The development of the "limited liability partnership" or "registered
limited liability partnership" (jointly "LLP") highlights the rush toward lim-
ited liability havens. An LLP is a general partnership that is subject to usu-
ally a one paragraph statutory provision restricting its liability if appropriate
documentation is filed with a state.'34 Although LLPs were tailored for pro-
fessional service practices, they have proliferated-and may continue to pro-
liferate-outside of the professional domain.
124 See id.
125 See Prop. Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-1 to -3, 42 Fed. Reg. 1038 (1977).
126 See 42 Fed. Reg. 1489 (1977).
127 See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(2) to -2(a)(4), -2(g) example (1), 45 Fed. Reg.
70,909 (1980).
128 See I.R.S. News Release IR-82-145 (Dec. 16, 1982).
129 See Rev. Proc. 72-13, 1972-1 C.B. 735.
130 See Rev. Proc. 89-12, 1989-1 C.B. 798.
131 See I.R.C. § 7704 (1994) (reclassifying certain publicly traded partnerships as corpora-
tions); see also H.R. REP. No. 100-495, at 947-50 (1987) (discussing classification and treatment
of publicly traded partnerships).
132 See I.R.C. § 7704.
133 See id.; see also I.R.S. Notice 88-75, 1988-2 C.B. 386 (defining publicly traded partner-
ship and setting forth transition rules for existing partnership in accordance with Code § 7704);
Sheldon I. Banoff, Avoiding Publicly Traded Partnerships Status: Living and Dying with Notice
88-75, 66 TAXES 561 (1988) (advising how to avoid publicly traded partnership status under new
Service guidelines).
134 Thus, LLPs do not require formation of a new organization or execution of new constit-
uent documents.
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Generally, the liability protection accorded LLP owners is not as exten-
sive as that accorded their corporate counterparts. Although many statutes
only protect partners against liability for tort debt-but not contract debt-
several states' statutes-including Minnesota's and New York's-limit liabil-
ity for entity debt under all theories.13s The Service has ruled that New York
LLPs are partnerships for federal income tax purposes despite such absolute
limited liability.136
In limiting the liability of general partners, but as an overlay on the well-
known partnership law foundation, such legislation providing absolute lim-
ited liability could produce renewed interest in the general partnership.
Some of the LLP statutes apply only to partnerships of persons rendering
professional services. 37 Others restrict the protection to limiting personal
liability for the liabilities of copartners, without affecting liability for
other obligations of the partnership. 138 LLP amendments to the general part-
nership laws that limit liability for all types of activities and for all partner-
ship obligations, 139 if adopted by a number of states, 140 would provide
competition for the limited liability company, at least in the context of close
relationships where centralized management is not desired. The LLP move-
ment establishes some interesting dynamics in the choice of business entity.
If the participants seek a partnership structure, but with limited liability, the
LLP is available and offers the benefits of a greater degree of certainty. In
addition, if the nature and application of interowner fiduciary duties is im-
portant to the organizers, the LLP may be desired as it is subject to the ex-
isting state partnership regime.
135 See MI-N. STAT. ANN. § 323.14 (West 1995); N.Y. PARTNERSmP LAW § 26(b) (McKin-
ney Supp. 1996); see also Robert W. Hamilton, Registered Limited Liability Partnerships: Present
at the Birth (Nearly), 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 1065, 1087-1102 (discussing the Minnesota and New
York LLP statutes).
136 See Rev. Rul. 95-55, 1995-35 I.R.B. 13 (concluding that a New York LLP is classified as
a partnership for federal tax purposes).
137 See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 87.020.7 (Michie 1995) (LLP not limited to profes-
sional services); NY PAR-NRsHnP LAWS § 121-1500(a) (McKinney Supp. 1995) (LLP not limited
to professional services). But see CAL. COR. CODE §§ 15001-15800 (West Supp. 1996) (limiting
LLPs to accountants and attorneys); OR. REv. STAT. § 68.110 (1995) (limiting LLPs to defined
professions).
138 See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 50-15(2)(B)-(C) (Michie Supp. 1996) (repealed effective
Jan. 1, 2000). Under the Virginia statute, a partner is not liable for "debts, obligations and liabil-
ities... arising from negligence, malpractice, wrongful acts or misconduct committed ... by
another partner, employee, agent or representative of the partnership." Id. § 50-15(2)(B). A
partner is, however, liable "for his own negligence, malpractice, wrongful acts or misconduct, or
for the negligence, malpractice, wrongful acts or misconduct of any employee, agent or represen-
tative acting under his direct supervision and control in the specific activity in which the negli-
gence, malpractice, wrongful acts or misconduct occurred." Id. § 50-15(2)(C).
139 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 323.14.
140 Until a number of states adopt LLP legislation, the LLP will suffer from the limited
liability company's initial uncertainty in recognizing the limited liability shield in interstate trans-
actions. See infra notes 141-177 and accompanying text. As of September 1, 1994, 17 states and
the District of Columbia had enacted LLP legislation. See Elizabeth G. Hester, Practical Guide
to Registered Limited Liability Partnerships, in 5 STATE LnirrED LxAniLrr: COMPANY & PART-
NERSHHp LAWS LLP-1, LLP-2 to -3 (Michael A. Bamberger & Arthur J. Jacobson eds., Supp. I
1996). In addition, three states enacted provisions recognizing foreign LLPs imported into their
jurisdictions, in the absence of a host jurisdiction LLP enabling statute. See id. at LLP-2.
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D. The Tentative Ascendancy of the Limited Liability Company
As a final tribute to the tax-driven nature of business organization law
and the power of the Kintner regulations, the limited liability company
("LLC") has caused a minor business revolution over the past decade. The
history of the LLC has received exhaustive scholarly attention;141 accord-
ingly, our discussion here is an overview of the essential facts.
In 1977, Wyoming adopted the first modern' 42 LLC act in the United
States, creating a new business entity that would provide both limited liability
and federal partnership income tax treatment. 143 Florida followed with LLC
legislation in 1982.144 In 1982, the Service began a study of the LLC and
suspended the further issuance of private letter rulings concerning the classi-
fication of LLCs as partnerships for federal income tax purposes.145
Initial concerns about the federal income tax classification of LLCs were
appeased with the completion of the Service study and issuance in 1988 of a
landmark revenue ruling granting a favorable partnership classification for
the Wyoming LLC.146 With the tax consequences of the LLC more assured,
Colorado and Kansas started the second wave of LLC legislation by enacting
statutes in 1990.147 Four states enacted LLC statutes in 1991,148 ten did so in
1992,'149 twenty adopted legislation in 1993,150 ten in 1994,151 and one addi-
141 See infra note 156 (referring to the large number of articles previously written about the
LLC).
142 The limited partnership association, adopted in Pennsylvania, Michigan, New Jersey,
and Ohio in the 1870s, was arguably the LLC's unsuccessful ancestor. See Wayne M. Gazur &
Neil M. Goff, Assessing the Limited Liability Company, 41 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 387, 393-94
(1991). In fact, the 1977 Wyoming statute utilized some language from the Ohio limited partner-
ship association statute. See id. at 395.
143 See Wyoming Limited Liability Company Act, ch. 158, 1977 Wyo. Sess. Laws 537 (codi-
fied as amended at Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-15-101 to -144 (Michie 1989 & Supp. 1996)); Philip
P. Whynott, North American Trade Treaty Stimulates Interest in US LLCs: A Historical Update, 1
LIMITED LIABILITY CoMPANY REP. 93-106, 93-106 to -107 (1993). The LLC concept was intro-
duced in Germany in 1892 by a law authorizing the formation of the private limited company,
the Gesellschaft mit beschrankter Haftung ("GmbH," or LLC). See Kristin A. DeKuiper, The
European Limited Liability Company-A Comparison of the Czech, Slovak and German Exam-
ples with the New American Entity, 1 PARKER SCn. J. E. EuR. L. 291, 291 (1994).
144 See Richard Johnson, Comment, The Limited Liability Company Act, 11 FLA. ST. U. L.
REv. 387, 387 (1983).
145 See Gazur & Goff, supra note 142, at 445.
146 See Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360, 361.
147 See infra note 153.
148 Nevada, Texas, Utah, and Virginia. See infra note 153.
149 Arizona, Delaware, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota, Oklahoma, Rhode
Island, and West Virginia. See infra note 153.
150 Alabama, Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Maine, Michigan,
Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina,
North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, and Wisconsin. See infra note 153.
151 Alaska, California, Kentucky, Mississippi, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Caro-
lina, Tennessee, and Washington. See infra note 153.
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tional state adopted LLC legislation in 1995.152 Presently, forty-eight states
have some version of LLC legislation.153
152 Massachusetts enacted an LLC statute effective January 1, 1996. See Massachusetts
Limited Liability Company Act, 1995 Mass. Acts ch. 281 (codified at MASS. ANN. LAWS ch.
156C, §§ 1-68 (Law Co-op. Supp. 1996)).
153 See Alabama Limited Liability Company Act, No. 724, 1993 Ala. Acts 1425 (codified at
ALA. CODE §§ 10-12-1 to -61 (1994)); Alaska Limited Liability Act, 1994 Alaska Sess. Laws ch.
99 (codified at ALASKA STAT. §§ 10.50.010-.995 (Michie Supp. 1995)); Act of June 2, 1992, ch.
113, 1992 Ariz. Sess. Laws 394 (codified at ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 29-601 to -857 (West
Supp. 1996)); Small Business Entity Pass Through Act, No. 1005, 1993 Ark. Acts 2928 (codified
at ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-32-101 to -1316 (Michie 1996)); Beverly-Killea Limited Liability Com-
pany Act, 1994 Cal. Stat. ch. 1200 (codified at CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 17000-17705 (West Supp.
1996)); Colorado Limited Liability Company Act, ch. 58, 1990 Colo. Sess. Laws 414 (codified as
amended at CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-80-101 to -913 (West Supp. 1996)); Connecticut Lim-
ited Liability Company Act, No. 267, 1993 Conn. Acts 884 (Reg. Sess.) (codified at CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 34-100 to -242 (West Supp. 1996)); Act effective Oct. 1, 1992, ch. 434, 68 Del.
Laws 1329 (codified as amended at DEL CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 18-101 to -1107 (1993 & Supp.
1994)); Florida Limited Liability Company Act, 1993 Fla. Laws ch. 284 (codified at FLA. STAT.
ANN. §§ 608.401-.514 (West Supp. 1996)); Georgia Limited Liability Company Act, No. 174,
1993 Ga. Laws 123 (codified as amended at GA. CODE ANN. §§ 14-11-100 to -1109 (1994 &
Supp. 1996)); Act of March 26, 1993, ch. 224, 1993 Idaho Sess. Laws 760 (codified as amended at
IDAHO CODE §§ 53-601 to -672 (1994 & Supp. 1996)); Limited Liability Company Act, Public
Act 87-1062, 1992 Ill. Laws 2529 (codified at 805 ILL COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/1-1 to 60-1 (West
Supp. 1996)); Indiana Business Flexibility Act, P.L. 8, 1993 Ind. Acts 1694 (codified as amended
at IN.D. CODE ANN. §§ 23-18-1-1 to -13-1 (West 1994 & Supp. 1996)); Iowa Limited Liability
Company Act., ch. 1151, 1992 Iowa Acts 238 (codified at IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 490A.100-.1601
(West Supp. 1996)); Kansas Limited Liability Company Act, ch. 80, 1990 Kan. Sess. Laws 585
(codified at KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-7601 to -7651 (1995)); Kentucky Limited Liability Company
Act, ch. 389, 1994 Ky. Acts 1087 (codified at Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 275.001-.455 (Banks-
Baldwin Supp. 1996)); Limited Liability Company Law, No. 780, 1992 La. Acts 2083 (codified as
amended at LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 12:1301 to :1369 (West 1994 & Supp. 1996)); Maine Limited
Liability Company Act, ch. 718, 1993 Me. Laws 2168 (codified at ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 31,
§§ 601-762 (West 1996)); Maryland Limited Liability Company Act, cl. 536, 1992 Md. Laws 3286
(codified as amended at MD. CODE ANN., CoRPs. & Ass'Ns §§ 4A-101 to -1103 (1993 & Supp.
1996)); Michigan Limited Liability Company Act, No. 23, 1993 Mich. Pub. Acts 138 (codified at
MICH. COMP. LAWs ANN. §§ 450.4101-.5200 (West Supp. 1996)); Minnesota Limited Liability
Company Act, ch. 517, 1992 Minn. Laws 1168 (codified as amended at MNN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 322B.01-.960 (West 1995 & Supp. 1997)); Mississippi Limited Liability Company Act, ch. 402,
1994 Miss. Laws 215 (codified at Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 79-29-101 to -1204 (1996)); Missouri Lim-
ited Liability Company Act, 1993 Mo. Laws 965 (codified at Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 347.010-.740
(West Supp. 1996)); Montana Limited Liability Company Act, ch. 120, 1993 Mont. Laws 269
(codified at MoNr. CODE ANN. §§ 35-8-101 to -1307 (1995)); Limited Liability Company Act,
LB 121, 1993 Neb. Laws 333 (codified as amended at NEB. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-2601 to -2653
(Michie 1995 & Supp. 1996)); Limited Liability Company Act, ch. 442, 1991 Nev. Stat. 1184
(codified as amended at NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 86.010-.571 (Michie 1994 & Supp. 1995)); Act
of June 23, 1993, ch. 313, 1993 N.H. Laws 323 (codified at N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 304-C:1-85
(1995)); New Jersey Limited Liability Company Act, ch. 210, 1993 N.J. Laws 1215 (codified at
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 42:2B-1 to -70 (West Supp. 1996)); Limited Liability Company Act, ch. 280,
1993 N.M. Laws 2753 (codified as amended at N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 53-19-1 to -74 (Michie 1993
& Supp. 1996)); New York Limited Liability Company Act, ch. 576, 1994 N.Y. Laws 1347 (codi-
fied at N.Y. LTD. LAB. Co. LAW §§ 101-1403 (McKimey Supp. 1996)); North Carolina Limited
Liability Company Act, ch. 354, 1993 N.C. Sess. Laws 1080 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 57C-
1-01 to -10-07 (1993)); North Dakota Limited Liability Company Act, ch. 92, 1993 N.D. Laws
390 (codified at N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 10-32-01 to -155 (1995)); Act effective July 1, 1994, 1994
Ohio Laws 634 (codified at OHxo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 1705.01-.58 (Anderson Supp. 1995));
Oklahoma Limited Liability Company Act, ch. 148, 1992 Okla. Sess. Laws 483 (codified at
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Structurally, the LLC represents a new hybrid to the business entity
montage in its attempt to balance limited liability with conduit taxation. Un-
like a limited partnership, in which a general partner has personal liability to
third parties for the recourse debts of the partnership, 154 an LLC has no such
owner who bears that responsibility for LLC debts. 55
Many LLC codes derive from a partnership organizational frame-
work,'56 reflecting both the form of entity that the parties would have ulti-
mately chosen157 and the need to ensure the classification of the LLC as a
"partnership" for federal income tax purposes. The common LLC statutory
requirements of multiple members, 58 the potential for dissolution 159 upon
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 2000-2060 (West Supp. 1997)); Oregon Limited Liability Company
Act, ch. 173, 1993 Or. Laws 435 (codified at OR. REV. STAT. §§ 63.001-.990 (Supp. 1994)); Lim-
ited Liability Company Law of 1994, No. 106,1994 Pa. Laws 703 (codified at 15 PA. CoNs. STAT.
ArN. §§ 8901-8998 (West 1995)); Rhode Island Limited Liability Company Act, ch. 280, 1992
R.I. Pub. Laws 1108 (codified as amended at R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 7-16-1 to -75 (1992 & Supp.
1995)); South Carolina Limited Liability Company Act, No. 448,1994 S.C. Acts 4856 (codified at
S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 33-43-101 to -1409 (Law Co-op. Supp. 1995)); Act of March 13, 1993, cl.
344, 1993 S.D. Laws 535 (codified at S.D. CODIFED LAWS §§ 47-34-1 to -59 (Michie Supp.
1996)); Tennessee Limited Liability Company Act, cl. 868, 1994 Tenn. Pub. Acts 654 (codified at
TENN. CODE ANNm. §§ 48-201-101 to -248-606 (Supp. 1995)); Act effective Aug. 26,1991, ch. 901,
1991 Tex. Gen. Laws 3161 (codified at TF.x. REv. Cirv. STAT. AN. art. 1528n (West Supp. 1997));
Utah Limited Liability Company Act, ch. 258, 1991 Utah Laws 991 (codified as amended at
UTAH CODE ANN.. §§ 48-2b-101 to -158 (1994 & Supp. 1996)); Virginia Limited Liability Com-
pany Act, 1991 Va. Acts cl. 168 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-1000 to -1073 (Michie
1993)); Washington Limited Liability Company Act, ch. 211, 1994 Wash. Laws 1018 (codified at
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 25.15.005-.902 (West Supp. 1997)); Uniform Limited Liability Com-
pany Act, 1996 W. Va. Acts ch. 256 (codified at W. VA. CODE §§ 31B-1-101 to -13-1306 (1996));
Act of December 14, 1993, ch. 112, 1993 Wis. Laws 708 (codified at Wis. STAT. ANN.
§§ 183.0102-.1305 (West Supp. 1995)); Wyoming Limited Liability Company Act, ch. 158, 1977
Wyo. Sess. Laws 537 (codified as amended at Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-15-101 to -144 (Michie
1989 & Supp. 1996)).
Hawaii's LLC statute becomes effective April 1, 1997. See Hawaii Limited Liability Com-
pany Act, 1996 Haw. Sess. Laws ch. 92 (codified at HAw. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 428-101 to -1302
(Michie, WESTLAW through 1996 Reg. Sess.)).
154 See REVISED UNE?. LTD. PA RImIlr Acr § 303 (amended 1985), 6A U.L.A. 144-45
(1995).
155 See, eg., MD. CODE ANN., CoREs. & ASNS § 4A-301 ("Except as otherwise provided
... no member shall be personally liable for the obligations of the limited liability company
.); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 42:2B-23 ("Except as otherwise provided ... the debts, obligations and
liabilities of a limited liability company, whether arising in contract, tort, or otherwise shall be
solely the debts, obligations and liabilities of the limited liability company.., no member...
shall be obligated personally .... ).
156 For a bibliography of LLC literature, see Daniel J. Jacobs, Limited Liability Companies
(LLCs): A Selective Bibliography with Statutory References, 49 REc Ass'N B. Crry N.Y. 901
(1994). See also Gazur & Goff, supra note 142 (assessing the LLC form); Robert R. Keatinge et
al., The Limited Liability Company: A Study of the Emerging Entity, 47 Bus. LAw. 375 (1992)
(comparing LLC's to other business organization forms and analyzing state LLC statutes).
157 See; e.g., Scott R. Anderson, The Illinois Limited Liability Company: A Flexible Alterna-
tive for Business, 25 Loy. U. Cirr. L.J. 55, 103 (1993) ("LLCs, particularly member-managed
LLCs, are likely to be closely held .... ).
158 Several states-including Arkansas, Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Missouri, Mon-
tana, New Mexico, New York, and Texas-permit one-member LLCs, although the federal in-
come tax classification of one-member LLCs remains uncertain. See generally LARRY E.
RmsTEn & ROBERT R. KEATiNGE, RIBSTEiN AND KEATINGE ON LImiTED LiABiLrrY COMPA-
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events occurring with regard to members, and the limited transferability of
ownership interests, all aim to ensure the desired partnership income tax
classification. 160 But the emergence of the LLC does not represent a simplifi-
cation of business organization law: ongoing experimentation by legislative,
judicial, regulatory, and practitioner fiat will result in a complex array of laws
that simultaneously revisit issues already settled in other contexts and ad-
dress fresh issues anew.
Indeed, several commentators have expressed serious reservations about
the LLC.161 Professor Rands states that the LLC's "emergence is an example
of badly formulated tax law," stressing that "the germinal point in the history
of limited liability companies was the issuance of Revenue Ruling 88-76,
which interprets the long outdated Kintner Regulations and applies them to a
Wyoming state statute!"'162 Professor Rands concludes that, at best, LLCs
are a marginal improvement over current limited partnerships and are less
desirable than corporations inasmuch as LLCs are fraught with
uncertainty. 163
The desirability of an LLC generally decreases as its number of mem-
bers increases because of the tax sensitive requirement of potential dissolu-
tion with respect to all members. Nevertheless, the Service has recently
approved LLC continuity provisions tied to events occurring with respect to
only member-managers, with majority approval of the members for continua-
tion, although that issue continues to be in flux.164 This instability under-
scores the LLC's intrinsic vulnerability to the whims of both the Treasury and
the Service.
The corporate characteristic of free transferability of interests illustrates
another potential problem with LLCs when the owners of an organization
who possess nonfreely transferable interests are related either by blood or
common ownership. A close relationship among the owners might preclude
NIES § 16.19 (1995). The Service will consider a ruling request regarding classification of an LLC
as a partnership for federal tax purposes only if the LLC has at least two members. See Rev.
Proc. 95-10, § 4.01, 1995-1 C.B. 501, 502.
159 Although most of the LLC statutes use the term "dissolution," the term "dissociation"
was introduced in the REVISED UNIF. PARTNE RSHm Acr § 601, 6 U.L.A. 72-74 (1995). "Dissoci-
ation" is also the term used in the UNiF. LTD. LL.nB. Co. Acr § 601, 6A U.L.A. 471-72 (1995),
approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws at its meeting
held July 29 to August 5, 1994.
160 See Susan P. Hamill, The Limited Liability Company: A Midpoint Evaluation, in 1994-1
N.Y.U. 52D INST. ON FED. TAX'N 1-1, § 1.02 (discussing classification of LLCs as partnerships).
161 See, e.g., Burke, supra note 62 (discussing the "uncertain future" of limited liability
companies).
162 Rands, supra note 6, at 32 (internal footnote omitted).
163 See id. at 36-37 (noting the uncertainties regarding, among others, veil piercing, fiduci-
ary duties, and member requirements).
164 On January 17, 1995, the Service issued Rev. Proc. 95-10,1995-1 C.B. 501, specifying the
conditions under which it would consider a favorable ruling request relating to classification of
an LLC as a partnership for federal income tax purposes. See id. § 1.01. The revenue procedure
permits dissolution events relating solely to member-managers, but upon dissolution consent to
continue must be exercised by "not less than a majority in interest of the remaining members."
Id. § 5.01. The revenue procedure includes many dissolution events-death, insanity, bank-
ruptcy, retirement, resignation, or expulsion-unless the taxpayer clearly establishes that the
event or events selected provide a meaningful possibility of dissolution. See id. § 5.01(2).
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the organization from lacking the corporate characteristic of free transfera-
bility of interests if the relationship of the owners could negate any transfer
restrictions.165 The problem will arise, for example, when the ownership in-
terests of an LLC are owned entirely by a single economic interest, such as an
individual and the individual's wholly-owned corporation. 166
Practically, the Treasury regulations governing an LLC's continuity of
life' 67 could impose a significant burden: any time any of the enumerated
events occurs, a unanimous-or majority-vote of the remaining owners
would be necessary to continue the LLC. In an LLC with many owners, the
likelihood of the event's occurrence and the difficulty of obtaining the requi-
site consent to continue may increase to an unacceptable level.168 Pursuant
to these regulations, an organization will lack continuity of life if it is dis-
solved upon bankruptcy, death, dissolution, expulsion, incapacity, or with-
drawal of any owner, notwithstanding any vote to the contrary by all or any
portion of the remaining owners. 169 To avoid the corporate-and potential
double tax-characteristic of continuity of life, the organization's operating
agreement, articles of organization, or both, or the operative state law, must
contain a provision that the foregoing events will cause dissolution of the
organization, without further action of the owners. 170 While a majority of
165 Free transferability of interests will be lacking if such a transfer requires consent of a
majority of nontransferring members. See Rev. Proc. 95-10, § 5.02, 1995-1 C.B. 501, 504; Rev.
Proc. 92-33, § 2.02, 1992-1 C.B. 782, 782.
166 In Revenue Ruling 77-214, the Service concluded that a German GmbH possessed the
corporate characteristic of free transferability of interests because its members were two wholly-
owned domestic subsidiaries of a single parent corporation. See Rev. Rul. 77-214, 1977-1 C.B.
408. In that situation, the Service reasoned, the parent corporation "could make all the transfer
decisions for its wholly-owned subsidiaries, despite any provision in the memorandum of associa-
tion that might indicate otherwise." See id.
Several years later, in Revenue Ruling 93-4, the Service reiterated much of the Revenue
Ruling 77-124 conclusion, noting that a provision requiring consent of the members was mean-
ingless when all of the members were commonly controlled, and that such a requirement thus
could not cause the entity to lack free transferability of interest. See Rev. Rul. 93-4, 1993-1 C.B.
225. The Service also indicated, however, that free transferability could still be avoided, even if
the members are commonly controlled, if the entity's organizational documents either (i) flatly
prohibit transfers of interest, or (ii) provide that a transfer triggers dissolution. See id. Based
upon this statement, commentators have suggested that if all the owners are to be commonly
controlled and free transferability of interest is to be avoided, the documents must be drafted so
that transfers are either flatly prohibited or dissolution occurs upon any transfer. See CARTER
G. BISHOP & DANIEL S. KLErNBERGER, LimrrED LiaBnrry COMPANIES: TAX AND Busmnrss
LAWv 12.07[5], at 2-111 (1994).
167 See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701 (1995).
168 Compare the limited partnership, in which typically only the event's occurrence with
respect to the last remaining general partner will trigger a dissolution. See id. § 301.7701-3(b).
169 See id. § 301.7701-2(b). Treasury Regulation § 301.7701-2 provides that continuity of
life does not exist if the death, insanity, bankruptcy, retirement, resignation, or expulsion of any
member will cause a dissolution of the organization. See id. § 301.7701-2. The regulation further
states that dissolution for this purpose does not mean termination of the business but rather a
change in the relationship of its members as determined under local law. See id Pursuant to
Treasury Regulation § 301.7701-2(b), the fact that an entity is given a fixed term of years as a life
does not destroy continuity of life. See id. § 301.7701-2(b).
170 See id § 301.7701-2(b).
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states appear to adopt this rule,171 even absent such a provision in the operat-
ing agreement or articles of organization, some states, such as New York,
permit variations. 172 An explicit provision best assures that an organization
controlled by a single person or entity, in a jurisdiction such as New York,
will lack continuity of life.173
The problem of linking management structure and tax status is exempli-
fied under current Treasury procedure. Revenue Procedure 95-10 suggests
that as long as managers are not designated or elected, any internal or con-
tractual agreement among the owners as to decisionmaking-such as
designation of an executive or management committee-will not result in
centralized management. 74 Treasury regulations emphasize that in order for
management to be centralized, the management powers must be exclusive. 7 5
For example, since all owners of a general partnership have apparent author-
ity to bind the partnership, no manager could have exclusive authority.176 In
this regard, if the owners of an LLC have and retain the authority to bind the
LLC as to third parties without notice, then perhaps there can be no centrali-
zation of management even though managers may be appointed. 177
The LLC is currently at a crossroads in its development: although forty-
eight states have adopted LLC legislation, the statutes lack uniformity. At
best, the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act may promote some uni-
formity and predictability. The underlying problem nevertheless has been
skirted: obsolete tax strictures have compelled state legislatures to arrive at
suboptimal forms of business organizations.
E. Further Efforts of State Experimentation
In 1990, the Delaware legislature passed the Delaware Business Trust
Act, radically updating an old form of unincorporated association-the Mas-
sachusetts or business trust-to empower entrepreneurs with greater free-
dom to structure their businesses. 7 8 In 1995, Wyoming enacted a similar
171 See, e.g., MrNN. STAT. ANN. § 322B.80(5) (West 1995 & Supp. 1997) ("A limited liability
company dissolves upon the occurrence... of an event that terminates the continued member-
ship of a member in the limited liability company .... ).
172 The New York Limited Liability Company Law allows for the managers to continue the
LLC by vote of the majority of interests remaining unless a prohibition in the operating agree-
ment or articles of incorporation states otherwise. See New York Limited Liability Company
Act, ch. 576, § 701, 1994 N.Y. Laws 1347, 1376-77.
173 See Rev. Proc. 95-10, § 5.01, 1995-1 C.B. 501, 504.
174 See id. § 1.03. Section 1.03 of Revenue Procedure 95-10 states that "[i]f the applicable
statute allows for management by one or more designated persons, managers are those persons
designated or elected by the members to act on behalf of the LLC." Id.
175 See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c) ("An organization has centralized management if any
person ... has continuing exclusive authority to make the management decisions necessary
176 See id.
177 See id. § 301.7701-2(c)(4).
178 See Delaware Business Trust Act, ch. 297, 67 Del. Laws 682 (codified as amended at
DEL- CODE ANN. tit. 12, §§ 3801-3820 (Michie 1995)). For an excellent overview of these laws,
see Dale A. Oesterle, Subcurrents in LLC Statutes: Limiting the Discretion of State Courts to
Restructure the Internal Affairs of Small Business, 66 U. CoL L. REv. 881 (1995).
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counterpart. 179 These two statutes represent a highly flexible form of entity
organization: participants in a business trust have virtually limitless discretion
in crafting the internal structure of a limited liability entity.180
A statutory trust may be either publicly or privately traded;' 8 ' beneficial
owners contribute capital' 82 and enjoy limited liability to the same extent as
shareholders of corporations or members of LLCs.' 83 The business and af-
fairs of a Wyoming statutory trust are "managed by or under the direction of
its trustees." 184 As to the voting power of the beneficial owners, the act pro-
vides unlimited flexibility to the organizers in specifying procedures for
trustee selection and direction. 8s There is no inherent right of beneficial
owners to vote on trustee selection, mergers, asset sales, dissolution, the crea-
tion of a subsidiary statutory trust, the creation of a new class of beneficial
interests, or even amendment of the governing instrument. 8 6 Any voting
rights of beneficial owners must be specified in the trust's governing instru-
ment and trustees may unilaterally file amendments to the trust certificate. 8 7
Suits against trustees for a breach of their duties are also to be controlled
by the governing instrument. The Wyoming Act notes that "[t]o the extent
that ... a trustee has duties, including fiduciary duties ... [they] may be
expanded or restricted by provisions in the governing instrument.' ' 88 Benefi-
cial owners can bring derivative actions, if the trustees refuse-or are un-
likely to agree-to act, 189 "subject to additional standards and restrictions...
179 See Wyoming Statutory Trust Act, ch. 16, 1995 Wyo. Sess. Laws 17 (codified at Wyo.
STAT. At~NN. §§ 17-16-1534, -23-101 to -302 (Michie Supp. 1996)). Although the Delaware and
Wyoming Acts are similar, important differences exist, including the Delaware requirement that
there be a resident Delaware trustee (Wyoming only requires a resident agent for service of
process); the Wyoming requirement of an annual report and annual fee (Delaware has neither
requirement); the Delaware default provision that beneficial interests are freely transferable
(the Wyoming default rule is similar to its LLC rule); and the Wyoming default rule on trustee
liability, which includes a business judgment standard of care (Delaware is silent on the issue and
may have as a default rule a prudent person standard). See DEL. CODE At'NN. tit. 12, § 3805(d)
(beneficiaries' interests freely transferable); id. § 3807 (resident trustee requirement); Wyo.
STAT. ANN. § 17-23-109(a)(ii) (resident agent for service of process); id. § 17-23-117(c) (annual
fee); id. § 17-23-105 (trustee liability).
180 See Larry E. Ribstein, Limited Liability and Theories of the Corporation, 50 MD. L.
REv. 80, 126-27 (1991) (noting that the "Delaware business trust statute demonstrates that the
states are approaching full-fledged recognition of the contract theory of the corporation").
181 A statutory trust may be organized for "any lawful purpose... whether or not con-
ducted for profit." Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 17-23-103.
182 See id. § 17-23-104.
183 See id. § 17-23-105(a).
184 Id. § 17-23-108(a).
185 See id. § 17-23-108(b).
186 See id. The section specifies that the trust instrument-which creates the trust and pro-
vides for the governance of its affairs-may "without limitation" allocate these rights among
beneficial owners and trustees. See id.
187 See id. § 17-23-114(c).
188 1d. § 17-23-108(c). Generally, a trust instrument may relieve a trustee of liability for
breaches of trust unless the breach is committed in bad faith, intentionally, or with reckless
indifference to the interests of the beneficiaries, or if a trustee has derived a personal profit. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 222(1) (1959) ("[IThe trustee... can be relieved of liabil-
ity for a breach of trust.").
189 See Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 17-23-120(a). The complaint must set forth with particularity
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in the governing instrument, including, without limitation, the requirement"
of a minimum ownership interest. 190 Subject to standards in a governing in-
strument, a statutory trust "shall have the power to indemnify and hold
harmless any trustee or beneficial owner... from and against any and all
claims and demands whatsoever."'191
The Wyoming and Delaware Acts include the following language: "It is
the policy of this chapter to give maximum effect to the principle of freedom
of contract and to the enforceability of governing instruments."'192 The Wyo-
ming Act provides that "[e]xcept to the extent otherwise provided in the gov-
erning instrument or in this chapter, the laws of this state pertaining to trusts
are hereby made applicable to statutory trusts."'193 Thus, even though gen-
eral trust doctrine may allow beneficial owners to sue on their own behalf for
trustees' breaches of duty, 94 allow a court to review trustee decisions under
an abuse of discretion standard, 9 5 or allow a court to remove and replace a
trustee,196 these doctrines can be superseded by a trust's governing
instrument.
F The Demise of the Current Organizational Regime
The justifications for our existing system of taxing business organiza-
tions are apparently limited to history and a need for revenue. The current
tax system discriminates between debt and equity, between distributed and
retained earnings, and between corporations and pass-through entities. The
result is economic inefficiencies and an overemphasis on tax planning. Ar-
guably, the income of businesses should be taxed once, whether or not dis-
tributed, at the marginal rates of the owners.197 This result has been
haphazardly achieved under the partnership and Subchapter S tax rules.
These tax-driven strictures have spawned an essentially new entity, the
LLC, in virtually every state, 98 thereby necessitating the creation of a whole
new body of law with all the resulting uncertainty. This upheaval has hap-
pened almost by accident and not as part of a purposeful effort to accomplish
some social or economic goal that could not have been achieved through
the effort by the beneficial owner to secure action by the trustees or the reasons for not making
the effort. See id. § 17-23-120(c). The plaintiff must be a beneficial owner or a successor to a
beneficial owner who held the interest at the time of the wrong. See id. § 17-23-120(b).
190 Id. § 17-23-120(e).
191 Id. § 17-23-121(a).
192 DEL CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3819(b) (1990); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 17-23-302(b).
193 Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 17-23-113.
194 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRusTs § 198 (1959) (legal remedies of benefici-
ary); id. § 199 (equitable remedies of beneficiary).
195 See id. § 187 (court review of exercise of trustee discretion under an abuse of discretion
standard); id. § 382 (removal of trustees).
196 See id. § 199(d), (e).
197 See, e.g., Charles E. McLure, Jr., Integration of the Personal and Corporate Income
Taxes: The Missing Element in Recent Tax Reform Proposals, 88 HARv. L. REV. 532,542 (1975)
("Under an ideal system of integration, a shareholder would pay the same rate of tax on corpo-
rate-source income, at the margin, as he pays on income from any other... source...."). But
see TREASURY REPORT, supra note 70, at 12-13 (adopting the view that all capital income should
be taxed at the same rate rather than at the rates of the shareholders).
198 See supra note 153 (listing states that have adopted LLC statutes).
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corporations, whose law has been developed with great sophistication for
generations, if not centuries.
A long-term failure of Congress, the Treasury, and the Service to define
and articulate in the tax law the basic policies implicit in business taxation has
forced state law makers to adapt to a wholly formalistic means of determin-
ing tax status. Although the LLC allows owners to achieve both pass-
through status and limited liability, it does so by forcing a turn away from the
well-established jurisprudence of corporate and partnership law, devising in-
stead a new branch of law that exists only because the tax classification rules
are so troublesome.
In recognition of these problems, the Treasury and the Service now ap-
pear willing to permit taxpayers to choose the kind of treatment they desire:
pass-through or two-level taxation. The Service first indicated its flexibility
in publishing a revenue ruling permitting classification of LLCs as partner-
ships-and therefore pass-through entities' 99-even though the Treasury's
own classification regulations could have been amended to provide other-
wise-most recently, in the Treasury's consideration of elective treatment for
nonpublicly traded LLCs. Congress has thus far remained silent on this
decision.
On December 18, 1996, the Treasury finalized its revolutionary "Simpli-
fication of Entity Classification Rules" ("1996 Final Regulations") that be-
came effective January 1, 1997. The 1996 Final Regulations replace the
existing classification regulations with a simplified regime that is elective for
certain business organizations. 200 Stressing that, under the current system,
"taxpayers and the IRS must expend considerable resources on classification
issues," 201 the Treasury and the Service aimed "to replace the increasingly
formalistic rules . . .with a much simpler approach that generally is
elective." 202
The 1996 Final Regulations define "corporation" to include any business
entity that is formed as a corporation under state law or taxable as a corpora-
tion under another provision of the Code, noting that a business entity that is
publicly traded is taxable as a corporation.2 3 Thus, the 1996 Final Regula-
tions continue to highlight "publicly traded" status as a determinative factor
of entity classification. 204
According to the 1996 Final Regulations, an eligible entity with at least
two members can elect to be classified as an association (with entity tax sta-
199 See Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360 (concluding that an unincorporated organization
operating under state LLC law is a partnership for federal tax purposes).
200 See Simplification of Entity Classification Rules, 61 Fed. Reg. 66,584, 66,584 (1996) (to
be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 301).
201 Simplification of Entity Classification Rules, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,989, 21,990 (1996) ("1996
Proposed Regulations") (noting that "since the issuance of Rev. Rul. 88-76, the IRS has issued
seventeen revenue rulings analyzing individual state limited liability company statutes, and has
issued several revenue procedures and numerous letter rulings relating to classification of vari-
ous business organizations").
202 Id.
203 See 26 C.F.R. § 301.7701-2(b); see also 1996 Proposed Regulations, 61 Fed. Reg. at
21,991.
204 See § 301.7704; 1996 Proposed Regulations, 61 Fed. Reg. at 21,991.
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tus) or a partnership (with conduit tax status), and an eligible entity with a
single owner may elect to be classified as an association or to be disregarded
as an entity separate from its owner. 205 Under the 1996 Final Regulations'
default rules, a newly formed domestic eligible entity will be classified as a
partnership if it has two or more members unless an election is filed to class-
ify the entity as an association.206 Thus, the 1996 Final Regulations provide a
default rule that approximates owners' expectations more closely.207 Under
the 1996 Final Regulations, eligible entities existing prior to the effective date
of the regulations choosing to retain their current classification need not file
an election.208
Generally, an eligible entity not intending to adopt the classification pro-
vided by the applicable default provision-or that seeks to change its classifi-
cation-may file an election to obtain the chosen classification by filing with
the appropriate service center2 9 An eligible entity electing to change its
classification "cannot change its classification by election again during the
sixty months succeeding the effective date of the election. ''21°
We applaud the 1996 Final Regulations as the first step in exalting sub-
stance over form. The task remaining is to identify an optimal business or-
ganization structure that harnesses this long awaited opportunity to focus on
the substance of business organization law rather than formal characteristics.
III. A Proposal for Unifying Business Organization Law
This Part attempts to harness the fundamental, underlying nature of
business firms and to distill the essential character of business organization
law toward arriving at a framework for unifying business organization law.
Accordingly, Part III.A explores the nature and role of business organization
law. Part III.B considers when, if ever, double-taxation should be imposed
upon a firm. Part III.C reformulates the organizational and taxation compo-
nents discussed above and presents a proposal for a unified business organi-
zation law.
205 See § 301.7701-3(a). "Eligible entity" is referred to in the regulation as a business entity
that is not required to be classified as a corporation under § 301.7701-2(b), (3)-(8).
206 See id. Similarly, if that entity has a single member, it will not be treated as an entity
separate from its owner for federal tax purposes unless an election is filed to classify the organi-
zation as an association. See iU.
207 See 1996 Proposed Regulations, 61 Fed. Reg. at 21,992.
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A. The Role of Business Organization Law
Business firms are at once entities21 ' susceptible to "reification 212 and
"persons" 213 capable of entering into contracts, owning real and personal
property, suing and being sued, appointing agents, transacting business, and
even making payments and charitable donations in the "name of the corpora-
tion. ' 214 Originally business organizations such as corporations were consid-
ered as created only by a "concession" of rights to a business "entity" by the
political state.215 Today, however, most commentators accept a "nexus" of
contracts theory of firms, positing that a firm is merely the aggregate of the
many contractual relationships of which it is composed.216
211 See ALFRED F. CONARD, CORPORATIONS IN PERSPEcrvE 441-43 (1976) ("People or-
ganized in corporations have a somewhat different aspect than people acting individually, chiefly
because the benefits and burdens and powers of decision are so dissipated among members of
the group.").
212 See, eg., WLLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., BushEss ORGANIZATION AND
FINANCE: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 109-10, 271-72 (5th ed. 1993). Klein and Coffee
describe the corporation as "reified."
That is, the law conceives of the corporation as having an existence separate from
that of its employees, customers, suppliers, and so forth-but mainly, from its
shareholders. Sometimes to be sure, the corporation is called a "fictional" entity-
in apparent recognition of the abstract and potentially misleading nature of the
concept. Still, there is the basic notion of a barrier, a psychological wall between
the shareholders (and other participants in the venture) and the corporation.
Id. at 109-10. Felix Cohen observes:
Nobody has ever seen a corporation. What right have we to believe in corporations
if we don't believe in angels? To be sure, some of us have seen corporate funds,
corporate transactions, etc. (just as some of us have seen angelic deeds, angelic
countenances, etc.). But this does not give us the right to hypostatize, to "thingify,"
the corporation ....
Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 CoLuM. L. REv. 809,
811 (1935).
213 Professor Hamilton describes the entity theory thus:
The nature of the fictitious entity that is a corporation is never precisely de-
fined. A corporation can be envisioned as an artificial person having most of the
same powers, rights, and duties that an individual has. This artificial person has no
flesh, no blood, no eyes, or mouth but it may nevertheless do many things that real
people do: it may sue and be sued, enter into contracts, purchase property, run a
business, and so forth.
HAMILTON, supra note 52, at 313.
214 See DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122 (1991); REVISED MODEL Bus. CORP. Act § 3.02
(1984) (amended 1996).
215 Although many commentators vilify the concession theory for its failure to account for
economic reality, see, e.g., William W. Bratton, Jr., The "Nexus of Contracts" Corporation: A
Critical Appraisal, 74 CORNELL L. REv. 407, 434-36 (1989), the concession theory apparently
remains persuasive to some, including the United States Supreme Court. See, e.g., CTS Corp. v.
Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 89 (1987) (quoting with approval Trustees of Dartmouth
College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819) (defining corporation as "mere crea-
ture of law")); cf Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, A New System of Corporate Govern-
ance.: The Quinquennial Election of Directors, 58 U. Cm-. L. REv. 187, 188 (1991) ("The Anglo-
American corporate form is a creation of the state, conceived originally as a privilege to be
conferred on specified entities for the public good and welfare.").
216 See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. EcoN. 305, 310 (1976) ("Contractual
relations are the essence of the firm, not only with employees but with suppliers, customers,
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In a classic statement of the nexus of contracts principle, Professors Jen-
sen and Meckling describe the firm thus:
The private corporation or firm is simply one form of legal fic-
tion which serves as a nexus for contracting relationships and which
is also characterized by the existence of divisible residual claims on
the assets and cash flows of the organization which can generally be
sold without permission of the other contracting individuals....
There is in a very real sense only a multitude of complex relation-
ships (i.e., contracts) between the legal fiction (the firm) and the
owners of labor, material and capital inputs and the consumers of
output.2
17
This quote touches upon the ongoing debate between the "paternalist" ver-
sus "contractarian" theories in corporate 218 and partnership219 law.
creditors, et.... It is important to recognize that most organizations are simply legal fictions
which serve as a nexus for a set of contracting relationships among individuals.") (footnotes omit-
ted). A number of legal commentators have adopted variations on this theme. A leading exam-
ple is Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV.
1416, 1418 (1989) ("The corporation is a complex set of explicit and implicit contracts, and cor-
porate law enables the participants to select the optimal arrangement for the many different sets
of risks and opportunities that are available in a large economy."). See also EASTERBROOK &
FIsCHmL, supra note 31, at 12 ("[W]e often speak of the corporation as a 'nexus of contracts' or a
set of implicit and explicit contracts. This reference, too, is shorthand for the complex arrange-
ments of many sorts that those who associate voluntarily in the corporation will work out among
themselves. The form of reference is a reminder that the corporation is a voluntary adventure,
and that we must always examine the terms on which real people have agreed to participate.").
217 Jensen & Meckling, supra note 216, at 311 (emphasis and footnote omitted). In a foot-
note to this quote, Jensen and Meckling elaborate on the role of law in their theory of the firm as
follows:
This view of the firm points up the important role which the legal system and
the law play in social organizations, especially, the organization of economic activ-
ity. Statutory laws sets [sic] bounds on the kinds of contracts into which individuals
and organizations may enter without risking criminal prosecution. The police pow-
ers of the state are available and used to enforce performance of contracts or to
enforce the collection of damages for non-performance. The courts adjudicate con-
flicts between contracting parties and establish precedents which form the body of
common law. All of these government activities affect both the kinds of contracts
executed and the extent to which contracting is relied upon. This in turn deter-
mines the usefulness, productivity, profitability and viability of various forms of
organization. Moreover, new laws as well as court decisions often can and do
change the rights of contracting parties ex post, and they can and do serve as a
vehicle for redistribution of wealth.
Id. at 311 n.14; see also MICHAEL J. TREBILcoCK, Tim Lmrrs OF FREEDOM OF CoNTRAcr 23-
163, 188-240 (1993) (discussing policy modifications of contract law concerning "commodifica-
tion," "externalities," "coercion," "imperfect information," "paternalism," and "discrimina-
tion"). For a contractarian perspective of limited liability, see EASTERBROOK & FiscmtL, supra
note 31, at 40-62 (describing limited liability as "a distinguishing feature of corporate law-
perhaps the distinguishing feature").
218 See e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Debate on Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law,
89 COLUM. L. REv. 1395, 1395-1415 (1989) (discussing contractual freedom in corporate law);
Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A Response to the Anti-
Contractarians, 65 WASH. L. Rnv. 1, 2 (1990) ("Today, the clearest controversy is between the
contractarians and anti-contractarians about the proper regard for freedom of contract in the
corporation."); Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation,
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What is the proper role, then, of business organization law? One answer
posits that organizational law should reduce the cost of drafting a firm's con-
tracts by providing a set of default rules that firms can adopt or reject at their
option. Organizational law should provide mandatory rules, but only where
doing so would reduce the adverse effects of externalities or imperfect infor-
mation, and only where the cost of such intervention is less than the benefit.
In the contractarian paradigm, 2 0 organizational law aims to provide
firms with a set of contract default rules that they can adopt or reject,221 their
content presumably mimicking the actual contracts that a majority of firms
would adopt in the absence of transaction costs. Because the social value of
default rules derives primarily from reduced transaction costs,2 2 an "ideal"
default rule would minimize contracting costs.223 One scholar notes that if a
default rule becomes less appealing than its drafters expected, or if the busi-
ness environment changes so as to render the term obsolete, the social costs
may be no greater than the transaction costs that firms incur in contracting
around the default.2 4
A "tailored" default rule crafted in open-ended language enables courts
to distinguish among firms in an attempt to mimic ex post the contract terms
heterogeneous firms would have adopted in the absence of transaction
costs.22 5 Tailoring may enable default rules to promote optimal contractual
terms while eschewing or eliminating suboptimal ones.2 6
1988 DuKE LJ. 879, 880 ("[D]escription drawn exclusively from contract principles are surely
mistaken."); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Close Corporations and Agency Costs,
38 STAN. L. REv. 271, 277-83 (1986) (comparing contractual mechanisms in closely and publicly
held corporations); Jason Scott Johnston, Opting In and Opting Out: Bargaining for Fiduciary
Duties in Cooperative Ventures, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 291, 292-301 (1992) (discussing the Coasean
Contractual Theory's application to the law of business associations).
219 See, eg., Claire Moore Dickerson, Is It Appropriate to Appropriate Corporate Concepts:
Fiduciary Duties and the Revised Uniform Partnership Act, 64 U. CoLo. L. REV. 111, 153 (1993)
(arguing that the application of contractarian principles to partnerships is "inappropriate");
Larry E. Ribstein, The Revised Uniform Partnership Act: Not Ready for Prime 7ime, 49 Bus.
LAW. 45, 52-82 (1993) (arguing that the Revised Uniform Partnership Act's drafters erred in
attempting to specify all duties and that the Revised Uniform Partnership Act should only set
forth basic rules, not a detailed contract for all partnerships); Allan W. Vestal, Fundamental
Contractarian Error in the Revised Uniform Partnership Act of 1992, 73 B.U. L. REv. 523 (1993)
(discussing how the Revised Uniform Partnership Act "rejects the fiduciary world view of the
common law and the [Uniform Partnership Act] for an essentially contractarian world view" and
arguing such "contractarian error" should be eliminated from the statute).
220 See supra notes 36-49 and accompanying text (discussing basic premise of contractarian
paradigm); see also infra notes 286-300 and accompanying text.
221 See EASTERBROOK & FiscHmL, supra note 31, at 34.
222 See David Charey, Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative Structure of Contract Inter-
pretation, 89 Mica. L. REv. 1815, 1842 (1991).
223 See Ian Ayres, Making a Difference: The Contractual Contributions of Easterbrook and
Fischel, 59 U. Cm. L. REv. 1391, 1403-08 (1992).
224 See Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA.
L. REv. 757, 826-27 (1995); see also David Charney, supra note 222, at 1841-42.
225 See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.. 87, 91, 117 (1989).
226 But see iL at 118 ("[T]ailored rules can actually exacerbate the inefficiency of strategic
incompleteness.").
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Business organization law's contractarian paradigm further provides a
broad view of the nature of business contracting and the role of business
organization law. This view adds a positive theory to the nexus of contract
metaphor: In general there are no significant information imperfections af-
fecting organizational contracting, and no third parties are adversely affected
by the terms of the organizational contract. Consequently, contracts that
maximize a firm's value maximize social wealth as well.227 Any mandatory
element of business organization law must be justified by a market fail-
ure228-an externality or an information imperfection-that severs the link
between individuals' maximizing behavior and social optimality. 2 9
This Part sets forth a proposal for unifying business organization law
consistent with the goals of the contractarian perspective. Its focus is on the
establishment of a framework for reform rather than the articulation of a
detailed business organization code or model legislation. Accordingly, this
Part considers first the possible basis for invoking double taxation upon busi-
ness organizations, assuming that retaining some double taxation is inevita-
ble. Second, and more fundamentally, this Part posits the structure of a new
unified business organization law.
In sum, we propose that the law governing business organizations be
reformulated so that there are precisely two distinct business organization
codes: the TCC and the SBC. All entities that are organized under the TCC
or are publicly traded would be subject to double taxation. All other entities
would be presumed to elect pass-through taxation under the SBC but, never-
theless, may choose to opt into the double-tax system.
B. Clarifying the Role of Double Taxation
Although full integration of the corporate and individual taxes may be
much desired as a matter of policy, the revenue implications of such a change
are politically prohibitive. Treasury has estimated that an imputation credit
system would generate a fully phased-in revenue loss of $14.6 billion per
year.23 0 Therefore, some form of continued double taxation appears
inevitable.
Initially, businesses formed under TCC should continue to be taxed as
corporations. The history of such taxation makes the traditional corporation
a handy vehicle for delineating the application of double taxation. This
bright line mechanism provides certainty in the choice of entity decision.
227 For the classic statement of this view, see EASTERBROOK & FisCnR-.., supra note 31, at 1-
39.
228 For an overview of differences of view within the contractarian paradigm, see Bebchuk,
supra note 218.
229 See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay
on the Judicial Role, 89 COLuM. L. REv. 1618 (1989).
230 See TREASURY REPORT, supra note 70, at 152. This amount is a net revenue loss. Inte-
gration by the imputation credit system would result in revenue gains where corporate income is
now taxed at less than the maximum corporate rate (the first $75,000 of income). See I.R.C. § 11
(1994). The corporation's shareholders are in higher marginal tax brackets than the corpora-
tion's effective tax rate. See id. § 1, amended by SBJPA of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188,
§ 1704(m)(1), (2)(A)-(B), 110 Stat. 1755, 1882-83.
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Beyond the traditional corporation, should other businesses be subject
to the double tax? Recent history and some important policies also justify
the conclusion that some other businesses, namely publicly traded enter-
prises, be taxed separately as well as corporations. Before turning to that
category, however, we should address a categorization currently in use and
often suggested that "large" businesses should be taxed differently than
"small" businesses.
1. Large Versus Small
Professor Curtis Berger considers the distinction between large and
small business entities as fundamental, suggesting that large entities should
be subject to a two-tier tax applicable to corporations while small entities
should be entitled to the pass-through treatment generally accorded to part-
nerships 31 Size would be determined by the enterprise's gross revenues
such that all small businesses-whether organized in partnership or corpo-
rate form-would enjoy conduit treatment.232 Entities would not be subject
to two-level tax until their gross revenues exceeded an unspecified
threshold.233
Another alternative method for distinguishing between single-tax enti-
ties and double-tax entities is the number of owners. This factor is one of the
most important features used in Subchapter S of the Code to distinguish sin-
gle-tax S corporations from double-tax C corporations.234 When the Treasury
originally established the limit of ten S corporation shareholders in 1958,235
the design was intended for small businesses, and simplicity was an important
goal.236 Limiting the number of shareholders achieved administrative sim-
plicity because the corporation's treatment of items of income or deduc-
tion-and Service auditing of that treatment-could affect no more than ten
tax returns233 7 To some extent, amendments to the statute to allow additional
shareholders, ultimately up to thirty-five under the 1982 amendment,238 com-
promised that simplicity.
231 See Curtis J. Berger, W(h)ither Partnership Taxation?, 47 TAX L. REv. 105, 106-07
(1992). Thus, large business entities, whether they are structured as corporations or partner-
ships, would be subject to the two-level tax. See id.
232 See id. at 106-07.
233 See iL at 107. The two-level tax would apply only if the entity's gross revenues re-
mained at a determined level for several years. See id. The shortcomings of this approach have
been identified by Professor Jerome Kurtz in connection with his alternative classification propo-
sal. See Jerome Kurtz, The Limited Liability Company and the Future of Business Taxation: A
Comment on Professor Berger's Plan, 47 TAx L. REv. 815, 816-18, 826-32 (1992).
234 See I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1)(A) (limiting the number of shareholders in an S corporation to
35), amended by SBJPA of 1996 § 1301, 110 Stat. at 1777. Under S corporation eligibility, the
shareholders must be individuals who are not nonresident aliens. See id. § 1361(b)(1)(C).
235 See Technical Amendments Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-866, § 64(a), 72 Stat. 1606, 1650
(1958).
236 See JAmEs S. EtJSTICE & JOEL D. KuNtrz, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF S COR'ORA-
TIONS 1.03[2][b] (3d ed. 1993).
237 See id
238 See Subchapter S Revision Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-354, § 1361(b)(1)(A), 96 Stat.
1669, 1669 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 1361).
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Nevertheless, a limitation based on the number of owners does provide a
clear dividing line-although circumvention is possible by stacking entities-
in Subchapter S. The possibility of manipulation of the number of sharehold-
ers in the S corporation context is precluded by requiring that only individu-
als-and certain trusts and estates 239-can be shareholders. 24° A similar
requirement could be imposed on SBOs. Alternatively, SBO ownership
could be limited to a fixed number of non-pass-through owners such as indi-
viduals and C corporations. Under this rule, the number of taxpayers whose
tax liabilities could be affected by the SBO's taxable income would be limited
to the fixed number, which is one of the principal goals of setting a maximum
number of permissible owners.
2. Public Versus Private
In addition to the separately taxed traditional corporations, we believe
that the decision to accord conduit versus dual-level taxation should hinge on
the distinction between publicly traded entities and private entities: publicly
traded entities would be subject to a two-tier tax, but privately held entities
in other forms would only be subject to a one-tier tax.2 41 The Code already
makes this public/private distinction,242 which appears to be functioning rea-
sonably well. 243
Focusing on the public/private distinction allows tax-free implications
with appreciated property in situations in which the transferor has not essen-
tially changed economic position.244 When a transferor of property receives
publicly traded securities, "the transferor has experienced a significant
change of position."245 Moreover, a public/private dichotomy may lessen the
necessity of distinguishing interest and compensation from dividends.246
On a practical level, allocating income among numerous entity owners
who frequently transfer their securities on the open market is nearly impossi-
ble with publicly traded companies; conduit treatment for nonpublicly traded
239 See I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1)(B), (c)(2), (c)(3), (d) (1994), amended by SBJPA of 1996
§§ 1316(a)(1), 1302(a)-(b), 110 Stat. at 1785-86, 1777.
240 See id. § 1361(b)(1), amended by SBJPA of 1996 §§ 1301, 1316(a)(1), 110 Stat. at 1777,
1785-86. S corporations, however, can be partners in a larger corporation.
241 See Kurtz, supra note 233, at 824-26.
242 See I.R.C. § 7704 ("[E]xcept as provided ... a publicly traded partnership shall be
treated as a corporation.").
243 See Kurtz, supra note 233, at 824-26.
244 See id. at 824. Kurtz explains:
The public/private distinction seems more appropriate... when the issue is the tax
implications of transactions between the entity and an owner of the entity. One
exchanging property for marketable securities quite clearly has experienced a sig-
nificant change of position, and the imposition of a tax on the transaction seems
appropriate. The change of position is usually less obvious where the exchange is
of property for an interest in a non-publicly traded partnership .... [If there is no
public/private distinction] all contributions of property to a small entity would be
tax-free, even if the entity is publicly traded and always taxable, even if to a closely
held partnership, as long as it were large.
Id.
245 Goldberg, supra note 50, at 1008.
246 See Kurtz, supra note 233, at 824-25.
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entities, however, poses few administrative burdens.247 Distinguishing be-
tween public and private entities may also facilitate a transition to an inte-
grated tax system whereupon publicly traded entities can accomplish
integration through an imputation credit system.
248
C. The Structure of the Proposed Legislation: Introducing the SBO
While the traditional corporation offers a ready-made organizational
structure, the law establishing a noncorporate business alternative should be
flexible and enable entrepreneurs to implement a variety of relationships and
structures in arranging their economic affairs.249 Such a law should remove
unnecessary operational and contractual restrictions while answering the ba-
sic needs of business through the creation of default rules promoting effi-
ciency consistent with likely business expectations. Most fundamentally, the
law should reflect the typical expectations of business participants with re-
spect to the basic attributes of the entity.
With these goals in mind, the fundamental attributes of such a law, our
proposed SBC, as set forth in Part III.C.1, are fairly clear: (1) limited liability;
(2) free transferability of interests; (3) continuity of life; (4) pass-through tax-
ation; and (5) inherent flexibility. Less clear is the desirability of centralized
management; we propose a framework of presumed owner management that
allows the owners maximum flexibility and freedom of contract.
The basic organizational and operational framework of an organization
formed under the SBC, the SBO, is reflected in two essential documents.
First, mirroring the Articles of Incorporation for TCOs, the basic parameters
of governance and owners' rights will be set forth in the SBO's Articles of
Organization. Second, as an analogue to the traditional corporate "bylaws"
and "shareholder control agreements," we propose a comprehensive SBO
"Owner Control Agreement." As discussed in Part III.C.2, this Owner Con-
247 See id. at 825.
248 See id. at 825-26. Under an imputation credit system, the corporate tax is viewed as a
withholding tax on shareholders' income. When the corporation makes an actual or constructive
distribution of income, the shareholders are treated as receiving both the distributed earnings
and the corporate tax paid on those earnings. See id.
249 This is not to say that there is not room for improvement, however, the preferable im-
provements are those aimed at preserving the essential scheme of treating the partnership as a
aggregate of its members rather than as a separate entity. Thus, desirable changes are those
designed to carry out that scheme more effectively and to prevent abuses. For example, Profes-
sor Andrews suggests that the basis adjustment rules under Code § 734(b) be made mandatory.
See William D. Andrews, Inside Basis Adjustments and Hot Asset Exchanges in Partnership Dis-
tributions, 47 TAX L. REv. 3, 23 (1991). Making the Code § 734(b) rules mandatory would pre-
vent abuses that can occur when appreciated property is distributed to a partner without
immediate recognition of gain at a time when there is no Code § 754 election in place. See id. at
23-24; see also FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECr, AMERICAN LAW INST., SUBCHAPTER K: PRoPos-
ALS ON THE TAXArION OF PARTNERS 5-9 (1984) (adopting the pass-through approach as the
model for taxing partnership earnings); Noel B. Cunningham, Needed Reform: Tending the Sick
Rose, 47 TAx L. REv. 77, 104 (1991) (advocating and endorsing Professor Andrew's proposals
relating to partnership distributions); John P. Steines, Jr., Unneeded Reform, 47 TAX L. REv.
239, 245 (1991) (questioning the need for reform of Subchapter K in the light of the fact that
many perceived abuses are addressed by recent expansion of Code § 704(c)(1)(B) to contribut-
ing partner redemptions).
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trol Agreement would set forth the basic contract between the owners and
the SBO. Typically, the Owner Control Agreement will include, among
other provisions, various owner protection devices, buy/sell provisions, confi-
dentiality clauses, and agreements to arbitrate disputes.
1. The SBC
a. Limited Liability
As stressed previously, limited liability is a sine qua non for optimal busi-
ness organization law;2s o accordingly, the SBC would create limited liability
through the same mechanisms and to the same extent as traditional corpora-
tions. The SBC would once and for all completely sever the link between
limited liability and double taxation. The limited liability/double-tax di-
lemma that has dominated business organization law up until now as an
archaic, inefficient, and ill-conceived tradeoff would cease to exist. Goodbye
forever.
Limited liability will attach as soon as the SBO Articles of Organization
are filed with the appropriate state authority. Just as with corporations, ab-
sent a personal guaranty to the contrary, no owner shall be subject to per-
sonal liability beyond her financial investment in the SBO. Such limited
liability may be subject to veil-piercing that initially will parallel current cor-
porate veil-piercing rules, but may evolve into a unique set of common law
principles. Tine will tell.
b. Free Transferability of Interests
[A corporation is] a person that never dies: in like manner as the
river Thames is still the same river, though the parts which compose
it are changing every instant.Z21
According to the traditional corporate norm, owners have the power to
transfer or to retain their ownership interests-shares-without interference
by the other owners or the corporation. This is the essence of the character-
istic of free transferability of interests. Likewise, the SBC would not restrict
transferability and SBOs would possess free transferability of interests. Busi-
ness owners will have the ability to modify or transfer their interests at will
without being concerned about the potential negative tax impact of that
freedom.
To be sure, however, voluntary restrictions on transferability would be
allowed, and often imposed, in the small business organization. Yet the na-
ture and extent of those restrictions would not be dictated or presumed, but
rather negotiated, thereby maximizing the freedom and choice of the busi-
ness participants. Specifically, the optimal restrictions on transferability for
any given SBO will be articulated in its Owner Control Agreement.
250 See supra notes 11-49 and accompanying text.
251 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *468.
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c. Continuity of Life
[With continuity of life], a perpetual succession of individuals are
capable of acting for the promotion of the particular object, like one
immortal being.25 2
The SBC would designate an SBO as an independent legal entity, sepa-
rate and distinct from its owners, and unaffected by changes in the identity of
the parties owning its shares. Thus, the SBO would possess continuity of life.
Business owners expect a business to continue operating despite the with-
drawal of one of the original participants. Goodwill and good business justify
the assumption of continuity of existence for the SBO, subject, as always, to
owner determination otherwise.25 3
In the event that an SBO intends to have a limited existence, such must
be set forth in the Articles of Organization or in the Owner Control Agree-
ment. In any case, such election shall have no impact upon the SBO's tax
status.
d. Presumed Owner Management
Corporate law invests the board of directors with the power to manage
the affairs of corporations. Because a centralized board and not the individ-
ual owners manage the corporation, centralized management exists. This
premise will continue for TCOs governed by TCCs.
However, we reverse the presumption under the SBC for SBOs: the
SBO would have presumptive owner management. Those investing their
money in a business generally expect to take an active voice in its affairs.
They should be presumed to be involved in the ongoing operations of the
business, but have the flexibility to alter that presumption without jeopardiz-
ing the SBO's tax status.
An entity run by managers who are elected by the owners, such as the
traditional corporation, on the other hand, generally will possess centralized
management3-5 Many organization participants may desire centralized man-
agement for nontax reasons, because-agency costs aside-it may allow for
more efficient management of the business.
Presuming an owner-managed firm, however, does not restrict the avail-
able management structures.25 5 Under some circumstances, an owner-man-
aged organization may require a manager who is also an owner.25 6 The
252 Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819) (Mar-
shall, C.J.).
253 Under current Treasury regulations, however, an organization which has continuity of
life faces increased risk of double taxation. This linkage is once again unfortunate. The flaw in
these machinations is that a continuity of life characteristic analysis should not be considered in a
tax analysis at all. Once again the current regulations highlight the frailty of this linkage. See
Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a) (1995).
254 See id. § 301.7701-2(c).
255 See Rev. Proc. 95-10, § 5.03(1), 1995-1 C.B. 501, 504.
256 See id. This could occur under the Treasury's regulations and Service ruling guidelines if
the member-managers in the aggregate own at least 20% of the total interests in the LLC so
that, in theory, they are regarded as looking after their own interests when they manage the
1996]
The George Washington Law Review
owners can also provide that an SBO has centralized management by
designating a person-or any group of persons that does not include all of
the owners-with continuing exclusive or nonexclusive authority to make the
management decisions necessary to the conduct of the business for which the
organization was formed. 257 In an organization with more than a few owners,
the owners may want to isolate management authority in one or more
owners.
Management structure, then, should be a function of choice rather than
an attempt to avoid unfavorable tax classification. By providing the pre-
sumption of owner management in the SBO and allowing maximum flexibil-
ity to change without affecting tax status, an optimal result is achieved.
2. The New Role for Owner Control Agreements
A key aspect to our proposal is the central role of the Owner Control
Agreement, as adopted by the owners of the SBO. Given the presumed
owner management of the SBO, Owner Control Agreements will emerge as
the operational "Bible" of SBOs. In effect, the Owner Control Agreement
enables the owners of each SBO to self-tailor their own business organization
law, together with all fiduciary duties and remedies the owners deem appro-
priate. Although this will impose drafting burdens upon the SBO at its initial
formation, it will also force the parties to think through their relationship
with each other and with the SBO.
We envision that Owner Control Agreements will parallel partnership
agreements in their ability to retain the potential for custom tailoring and
designing the SBO with much of the imaginative freedom that contracting
parties under our legal system generally enjoy. Although the Owner Control
Agreement, like other contracts, must be agreed to by all of the owners-and
generally can be amended only with unanimous consent of the owners-it
may set forth various self-tailored procedural rules requiring simple majority
vote (e.g., majority approval of certain implicated transactions) or some level
of supermajority vote (e.g., ratification of conflict transactions through two-
thirds owner approval).
Declaring in 1992 that "[i]t is the policy of this chapter to give the maxi-
mum effect to the principle of freedom of contract and to the enforceability
of limited liability company agreements, '25 8 Delaware enacted this compel-
ling provision that has been followed by several other states.25 9 Other subse-
quent statutes are based on the ABA Prototype Limited Liability Company
Act ("ABA Prototype Act").260
company rather than representing others' interests. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7704-2(c)(4) (relating
to limited partnerships); Rev. Proc. 95-10, § 5.03(2), 1995-1 C.B. 501, 504.
257 See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c).
258 DEL CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(b) (1993).
259 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 34-242 (West Supp. 1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 42"2B-
66(a) (West Supp. 1996); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-19-65(A) (Michie Supp. 1993); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 25.15.800(2) (West Supp. 1996).
260 WORKING GROUP ON THE PROTOTYPE LTD. LIAB. Co. AcT ET A.-, AMERICAN BAR
Ass'N, PROTOTYPE LIMrrED LIAmurY COMPANY Acr, reprinted in 1 STATE LIMITED LIAaILrry
COMPANY & PARTNERsmP LAWS PLLCA-1, PLLCA-1 to -139 (Michael A. Bamberger & Ar-
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Although LLC statutes embody several different approaches as to fidu-
ciary standards of conduct, many states, including Delaware, do not contain
any standards and simply enable parties to articulate codes of conduct in
their operating agreement. 261 Specifically, the Delaware LLC statute em-
powers the owners to tailor their own standards of owner conduct 262 and the
specification of penalties for the violation of those standards.263 Other states
prescribe a minimal standard of gross negligence and empower the parties to
change the standard by express agreement.264 In accordance with Delaware
precedent, we propose to leave this issue to the owners and the common law
of agency.
The ABA Prototype Act follows the "default rule" model, establishing a
minimal level of fiduciary duties that can be altered by an express operating
agreement. 265 The default rule in the ABA Prototype Act does not include
member-to-member fiduciary duties directed to the oppression of minority
members.266 Statutes patterned after the ABA Prototype Act are similar. 267
Likewise, the Owner Control Agreements for SBOs would be free to adopt
member-to-member fiduciary duties.
IV. The Impact of an SBO Regime
Once shorn of the shackles of the Service classification rules which exalt
form over substance, states can pursue two distinct pathways. First, state leg-
islatures can, at long last, enact substance-driven SBCs designed to maximize
economic efficiency, promote fairness, protect owners, and enhance flexibil-
ity. Second, states can continue their "race-to-the-top"-or "race-to-the-bot-
thur J. Jacobson eds., Supp. 1994) [hereinafter ABA PROTOTYPE Acr]. The Act is the model for
several jurisdictions. See, e.g., ARY. CODE ANN. § 4-32-1304(a)-(b) (Michie Supp. 1996); GA.
CODE ANN. § 14-11-1107(a)-(b) (1994).
261 See DEL CODE ANNm. tit. 6, § 18-306; NJ. STAT. ANN. § 42:2B-30 (West Supp. 1996).
262 See DEL- CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-306 (remedies for breach of LLC agreement by
member).
263 See id. § 18-405 (remedies for breach of LLC agreement by manager).
264 See eg., ARK. CODE ANNm. §§ 4-32-402, -404; CAL. CoRP. CODE § 17005(d) (West Supp.
1995); IDAHO CODE §§ 53-622, -624 (1994). Some of the newest statutes have ratcheted the
default standard up to "wanton or reckless misconduct." E.g., Ky. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 275.170(1) (Michie Supp. 1994). Colorado's 1994 revisions require that managers act in ac-
cordance with a core of nonwaivable duties but allow an agreement to determine standards "by
which the performance of the [good faith] obligation is to be measured, if such standards are not
manifestly unreasonable .... CoLo. REv. STAT. § 7-80-108(2)(c) (Supp. 1995).
265 See ABA PROTOTYPE Acr, supra note 260, § 402. The default duties are gross negli-
gence or willful misconduct and accounting for personal benefits from use of company assets or
information without the consent of the company. See id-
266 The ABA Prototype Act's due care language provides for culpability in cases of "gross
negligence or willful misconduct." Id. § 402(A). The duty of loyalty default standard in the
ABA Prototype Act focuses on an improper benefit received "without the consent of more than
one half by number of the disinterested managers or members" from "any transaction" with the
company or the use of company property. Id. § 402(B).
267 See eg., ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-32-402 (duties of managers and members); id. § 4-32-404
(limitation of liability and indemnification of members and managers); id. § 4-32-1310(a) (evi-
dentiary effect of copy of filed document); IDAHO CODE § 53-622 (duties of managers and mem-
bers); id. § 53-624 (limitation of liability and indemnification of members and managers); id.
§ 53-668(1) (rules of construction).
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tom," as the case may be-by enacting TCCs designed to satisfy interest
groups active within that state.
For SBOs, the substantive law should be dictated by the owners-by the
parties to the Owner Control Agreements. Those parties are best suited to
negotiate an Owner Control Agreement self-tailored to their particular re-
quirements. Perhaps the role of SBCs is to provide "menus" into which own-
ers can elect inclusion in their Owner Control Agreements. 268 In this case,
we would expect a commission on uniform state laws to promulgate a uni-
form set of "menus" to be incorporated into Owner Control Agreements at
the option of the negotiating owners.
Once states accede that the substantive law for SBOs must be left up to
the owners-and other parties to the Owner Control Agreement-such that
states are not mandating particular substantive terms to govern SBOs, the
resulting SBCs will focus on minimal procedural parameters. In focusing on
minimal procedural parameters in their SBCs, states will come to realize that
an optimal regime embodies no more than the SBO characteristics discussed
in the previous section together with basic procedural requirements that en-
sure fundamental fairness and protection of essential property rights.
In essence, the SBC will become a uniform statute that allows the parties
to particularize, through negotiation, the substantive terms of their relation-
ship to one another. Meanwhile, the TCC will continue to cater to that
state's special interest groups, and the resultant corporate governance provi-
sions (e.g., voting and inspection rights) will vary from state to state depend-
ing upon the nature and strength of the disparate lobbying efforts within each
state.
Thus, as to SBOs, the race to the top/bottom is irrelevant; as to TCCs,
the race is on as usual. The ultimate question, of course, is the impact of the
SBO regime upon both the destiny of business organization law and the fair
and efficient functioning of society.
A. Enhanced Economic Efficiency and Reduced Agency Costs
The key feature of the.., corporation is Adolph [sic] Berle and
Gardiner Means's insight concerning the separation of ownership
and control: managers of the firm, who run the business, are not the
owners.
26 9
Large publicly traded corporations are handcuffed to a centralized man-
agement regime. With thousands of passive shareholders scattered through-
out the globe, seldom will a shareholder seek to actively participate in the
management of the corporation-thus, the ineluctable need for centralized
management. Many smaller business entities, however, view centralized
management from a different lens: owners want to manage and managers
want to own. Absent a union of incentives, rewards, commitment, effort, and
entrepreneurial creativity, economic efficiency may flounder. A regime of
268 See, eg., Larry E. Ribstein, Statutory Forms for Closely Held Firms: Theories and Evi-
dence from LLCs, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 369, 372 (1995) (encouraging the adoption of free business
forms that would possibly include "all-purpose statutory business association 'menus' ").
269 ROBERTA ROMANO, FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE LAw at v (1993).
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centralized management may militate against this synergy of ownership and
control and tend to ill-serve privately held business organizations.
Economic policy plays a central role in the development of business or-
ganization law.270 Most wealth in corporate form is held by large, publicly
traded corporations.271 In these corporations, ownership is separated from
control. The firms are controlled by professional managers, while firm own-
ers-the shareholders-are largely passive.272 Although managers are en-
trusted with guarding shareholder interests, their own interests do not always
coincide with those of shareholders. Where the interests of these two groups
conflict, managers typically pursue their own interests, even at shareholders'
expense.273
Much of the conflict between shareholders and managers arises from
their divergent portfolios. Most shareholders hold fully diversified portfolios;
managers dedicate most of their wealth in their corporate employer, largely
in the form of firm-specific human capital. These different portfolios produce
different attitudes towards the risk of firm failure.274 Shareholders holding
fully diversified portfolios are effectively risk-neutral; 275 managers dependent
on the fortunes of their firm are risk-averse.276
270 See EASTERBROOK & FxscH.L, supra note 31, at 40-41; see also RIcHARD A. POSNER,
ECONOMIc ANALYSIS OF THE LAw 391-97 (3d ed. 1986) (describing the corporation in economic
terms).
271 See MATHESON, supra note 2, § 1:02 (noting that the 500 largest publicly traded corpora-
tions control roughly 40% of the total domestic wealth).
272 See ADoa A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MANqs, Tnm MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY 7-9 (1933); Ronald J. Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The
Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819, 833-36 (1981); see also
Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice, 39 UCLA
L. REv. 811, 815-20 (1992) (analyzing institutional investor monitoring and stressing that "corpo-
rate managers need to be watched by someone"); Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reex-
amined, 89 MICH. L. REv. 520, 521-22 (1990) (examining the nature and extent of shareholder
passivity but arguing that passivity is not inevitable).
273 See, e.g., Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. PoL.
ECON. 288, 288-90 (1980) (noting the "incentive problems" arising when decisions are left to
managers that are not also owners); Jensen & Meckling, supra note 216, at 305 (discussing the
effects of separating ownership from control).
274 See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 216, at 349-50,352-53; Alan J. Marcus, Risk Sharing
and the Theory of the Firm, 13 BELL J. ECON. 369, 369-70 (1982); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk
Taking and Ruiw Bankruptcy and Investment Choice, 20 J. LEGAL STuD. 277,277-79 (1991). See
generally Steven Shavell, Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship, 10
BELL J. ECON. 55, 55-57 (1979) (describing the risk allocation implicit in principal-agent pay-
ment arrangements).
275 Accordingly, owners generally desire managers to maximize each firm's expected prof-
its without regard to risk. But see Jonathan R. Macey, Agency Theory and the Criminal Liability
of Organizations, 71 B.U. L. REv. 315, 326 (1991) (noting that "[w]hile managers' efforts to
avoid bankruptcy by taking huge risks may benefit shareholders, often they do not").
276 See RONALD W. MAsuuts, TmE DEBT/EurrY CHoIcE 47-60 (1988) (describing poten-
tial conflicts of interest between stockholders and risk-averse managers); Jensen & Meckling,
supra note 216, at 306, 308-10 (discussing why "the agent will not always act in the best interests
of the principal"). For an empirical analysis, see Stuart C. Gilson & Michael R. Vetsuypens,
CEO Compensation in Financially Distressed Firms: An Empirical Analysis, 48 J. FN. 425, 440-
48 (1993); Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Bargaining over Equity's Share in the Bank-
ruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 125, 149-50
(1990); see also William J. Carney, Controlling Management Opportunism in the Market for Cor-
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Accordingly, risk-averse managers will sometimes pursue different in-
vestments than risk-neutral shareholders would choose. Shareholders gener-
ally want the firm to pursue any project, however risky, that has positive
expected profits; managers, by contrast, may avoid some high-risk projects,
even though these projects have positive expected profits.277 In addition,
managers may attempt to reduce the risk of firm failure by diversifying the
firm-e.g., by expanding the firm into new businesses that face independent
risks-even when such diversification results in a reduction in firm value.278
This reduction in firm value is borne by the shareholders, who generally de-
rive no independent benefit from the diversification of any one firm because
they already own diversified portfolios.279
Portfolio differences may produce another conflict between shareholders
and managers. Managers may pursue investment strategies not designed to
maximize profits but to secure their positions and increase their salaries.280
Managers may, for example, increase their value to the firm through irrevers-
ible investments in their areas of expertise28 1 or may attempt to preserve
porate Control: An Agency Cost Model, 1988 Wis. L. REv. 385, 418-20 (suggesting that manag-
ers' limited marketability may cause them to overreact when control of the firm is in question);
Rose-Ackerman, supra note 274, at 279-97 (arguing that managers fear loss of both job and
prestige if firm encounters financial difficulties).
277 See David Hirshleifer & Anjan V. Thakor, Managerial Conservatism, Project Choice,
and Debt, 5 REv. FIN. STUD. 437, 437-39, 465 (1992) (noting that managers' concern for their
reputations may exacerbate their tendency to pursue overly safe projects); Anjan V. Thakor,
Corporate Investments and Finance, 22 J. FIN. MGMT. Ass'N 135, 139-40 (1993) (discussing how
managers' incentive to "build their own reputations distorts firms' investment policies in favor of
relatively safe projects"); see also David Hirshleifer, Managerial Reputation and Corporate In-
vestment Decisions, 22 J. FIN. MOrT. Ass'N 145, 145-46 (1993) (describing reasons for, and ef-
fects of, managers' decision to build personal reputations). See generally BERLE & MEANS,
supra note 272, at 119-25 (addressing how the interests of control and ownership diverge in the
modern corporation); ADAM SMrrH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONs 699-700 (Edwin Cannon ed.,
1937) (suggesting that managers negligently operate corporations because they do not share the
interests of the owners); Jensen & Meckling, supra note 216, at 306, 308-10 (noting that in most
agency relationships there are costs associated with the divergence of the proprietor's and
agent's interests).
278 See, e.g., Randall Morck et al., Do Managerial Objectives Drive Bad Acquisitions?, 45 J.
FIN. 31, 31-32 (1990); Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Value Maximization and the Acquisi-
tion Process, 2 J. ECON. PERsP. 7, 13-15 (1988); see also Larry H.P. Lang & Rene M. Stulz,
Tobin's q Corporate Diversification, and Firm Performance, 102 J. PoL- ECON. 1248,1248 (1994)
(arguing there is no evidence that diversified firms are poor performers when compared to firms
that are not diversified).
279 Indeed, shareholders of firms pursuing activities with substantial potential tort liability
may prefer to organize these activities into separate corporations in order to gain maximum
benefit from limited liability.
280 In addition, managers may want to spend more on perquisites and other benefits than
shareholders would prefer. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 216, at 308-10.
281 See Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Management Entrenchment: The Case of Man-
ager-Specific Investments, 25 J. FrN. EcoN. 123, 123-24, 137 (1989); see also NANCY L. ROSE &
ANDREA SHEPARD, FiRM DIVERSIFICATION AND CEO COMPENSATION: MANAGERIAL ABILITY
OR ExEcUTIvE ENTRENCHMENT? 1-6,18-33 (National Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper
No. 4723, 1984) (suggesting that managing a diversified firm requires special managerial talent,
therefore, managers with this particular talent may have an incentive to diversify their firms in
order to maximize their value to the firm).
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their positions by expanding the firm into new businesses, even though share-
holder wealth maximization might dictate shrinkage or liquidation.
As a response to the increasing practical complexity of business deci-
sionmaking, centralized management has emerged as a virtual necessity for
large firms.282 Alfred Chandler has demonstrated how the corporate organi-
zational transformation developed efficiencies of scale and scope that helped
to spark a phenomenal period of economic growth in the twentieth cen-
tury.m Hierarchical business organizations may reduce transaction costs
when it is less costly to provide goods or services internally rather than
through market purchases or sales. 284 Central management may enhance ef-
ficiency by enabling managerial divisions of labor, through specialized educa-
tional training of future managers and differentiation of managerial
occupations within businesses 85
It is clear, however, that centralized management is best chosen as a
structural alternative, not mandated in substance or in form. The SBO
presumes owner management and thereby minimizes the agency costs associ-
ated with the separation of ownership and control. Any deviation from this
presumption requires a balancing of the benefits with the problems of incen-
tives and control. The owners of a business are best able to weigh these con-
siderations and make their own choices on the relevant tradeoffs.
282 See ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., SCALE AND SCOPE: THE DYNAMICS OF INDUSTRIAL
CAPrrALISM 17 (1990) (describing economies of scale as "those that result when the increased
size of a single operating unit producing or distributing a single product reduces the unit cost of
production or distribution"). Economies of scope are "economies of joint production or distri-
bution" that result "from the use of processes within a single operating unit to produce or dis-
tribute more than one product." Id.
283 Chandler describes this economic efficiency of centralized management:
Transaction costs are those involved in the transfer of goods and services from
one operating unit to another. When these transactions are carried out between
firms or between individuals, they usually involve the transfer of property rights
and are defined in contractual terms. When they are carried out within the enter-
prise, they are defined by accounting procedures. The costs of such transactions are
reduced by a more efficient exchange of goods and services between units, whereas
the economies of scale and scope are closely tied to the more efficient use of facili-
ties and skills within such units.
Id. (internal footnote omitted); see OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INsTrruTONS OF
CAPrrALISM: FmMs, MARKErs, RELATIONAL CoiwmAcrmo 15-42, 68-84 (1985) (discussing
transaction cost economics and the governance of contractual relations).
284 See CHANDLER, JR., supra note 282, at 8-9.
285 Professor Chayes summarizes the economic objective thus:
The corporation is necessary because the objects pursued are beyond the reach
of the members as individuals. The needed amounts of capital are too great, the
risk is too high, the duration of the enterprise too long. The corporation is the legal
institution which can hold the aggregated capital of many over a period of time
unaffected by the death or withdrawal of individuals.
Abram Chayes, The Modern Corporation and the Rule of Law, in THE CORPORAION IN MOD-
ER SocaITY 25, 34 (Edward S. Mason ed., 1960).
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B. Contractual Freedom and Flexibility
A contractarian model286 dominates business organization law scholar-
ship,287 positing that the firm embodies a "nexus of contracts" 88 or a collec-
tion of consensual relationships among shareholders, creditors, managers,
and perhaps other persons with vested interests. Some "contracts" are ex-
plicit, some implicit, and some provided by law. These contracts define the
rights and obligations of the firm's constituents, and they derive from a mar-
ket-mediated process that tends to lead the constituents of the firm to adopt
contract terms that maximize the firm's value. In the context of publicly
traded corporations, the pricing mechanism of the securities market, together
with a variety of managerial incentives designed to maximize share values,
compels corporate managers to adopt terms that minimize agency costs and
thus maximize firm value.Z89
Although the "nexus of contracts" theory remains persuasive for some,
other leading legal scholars discount the theory.290 Dean Robert Clark dem-
onstrates that a corporation cannot be considered a nexus of actual legal con-
tracts, and that metaphorical thinking about "implicit or standardized"
contracts is "troublesome" and "treacherous. '291 Other scholars argue that
contractarian theories of the corporation fail to account for many
"mandatory rules" of organizational law.292 These theories also fail to recon-
286 For a discussion of the contractarian model, see supra notes 36-49 and accompanying
text.
287 Dean Robert Clark has characterized the contractarian perspective as "dominat[ing] the
thinking of most economists and most economically oriented corporate law scholars who focus at
all on the theory of the corporation." Robert C. Clark, Contracts, Elites, and Traditions in the
Making of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1703, 1705 (1989).
288 Professors Jensen and Meckling coined the term "nexus for contracting relationships."
Jensen & Meckling, supra note 216, at 311.
289 For scholarship on the contractarian perspective in the economics literature, see Armen
A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62
AM. ECON. REv. 777 (1972); Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and
Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 301 (1983); Jensen & Meckling, supra note 216; Oliver Williamson,
Corporate Governance, 93 YALE L.J. 1197 (1984).
290 See, e.g., Victor Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of
Contract, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1403, 1404 (1985) (arguing that the contract theory improperly
legitimizes "substantially unaccountable managerial discretion to determine corporate activities
and to serve itself at the expense of investors"); Robert C. Clark, Agency Costs Versus Fiduciary
Duties, in PRiNciPALs AND AGENTS: THE STRucruR OF Busn, ass 55 (John W. Pratt & Richard
J. Zeckhauser eds., 1991); John C. Coffee, Jr., No Exit?: Opting Out, the Contractual Theory of
the Corporation, and the Special Case of Remedies, 53 BROOK. L. Rnv. 919, 972 (1988) (propos-
ing a modification of the contract theory in which corporations may opt out and choose "among
quality-controlled alternatives"); Lewis A. Kornhauser, The Nexus of Contracts Approach to
Corporations: A Comment on Easterbrook and Fischel, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1449, 1449 (1989)
(arguing that the contract metaphor suffers from ambiguity that limits its usefulness and sug-
gesting a partial return to the metaphor of trust).
291 ROBERT C. CLARK, CoipoRiAE LAW 59-71 (1986); see also Jean Braucher, Contract
Versus Contractarianism" The Regulatory Role of Contract Law, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 697,
698 (1990) (noting "the fact that contractarian theorists to some extent use the idea of contract
metaphorically" is troublesome).
292 See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 36, at 1486 (noting that if corporations were merely a
"nexus of contracts" they would be free to vary the terms rather than be bound by mandatory
rules); Gordon, supra note 41, at 1553 (arguing that although much of corporate law allows
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cile the central role of courts in enforcing contracts allowed by "enabling
rules. ' '293 Further, Clark and others disagree that one can properly consider
managers and directors of a corporation as legal "agents" of shareholders. 294
In the contractarian paradigm, firm managers select contract terms that
capital markets price and that investors purchase when they purchase a firm's
securities.295 Judge Frank Easterbrook and Professor Daniel Fischel state
that "corporate law is a set of terms available off-the-rack so that participants
in corporate ventures can save the cost of contracting.... Corporate codes
and existing judicial decisions supply these terms 'for free' to every corpora-
tion, enabling the venturers to concentrate on matters that are specific to
their undertaking. '296 Accordingly, socially optimal organizational law
would provide a set of "default" terms, any or all of which a firm could adopt
by inaction or reject by explicitly customizing an alternative term. Such de-
fault terms should parallel or mirror the terms that firms would select in the
absence of transaction costs. 297 Generally, an efficient default rule is one that
minimizes the aggregate cost of contracting.298
parties to contract freely and "opt out" of certain standard terms, many features of corporate
law remain mandatory). But see, e.g., Romano, supra note 41, at 1599, 1616 (arguing that many
"mandatory" rules may be avoided, although admitting that some mandatory rules are desirable
"when externalities are present").
293 See, e.g., Coffee, Jr., supra note 229 (analyzing the judicial role in corporate law and
discretionary judicial response to default rules).
294 Dean Robert Clark argues:
A review of elementary corporate law shows that [the] power of the principal
to direct the activities of the agent does not apply to the stockholders as against the
directors or officers of their corporation. By statute in every state, the board of
directors of a corporation has the power and duty to manage or supervise its busi-
ness. The stockholders do not. To appreciate the point fully, consider the following
activities: setting the ultimate goal of the corporation-for example, whether its
legal purpose will be to maximize profits; choosing the corporation's line of busi-
ness-for example, whether it will engage in retailing general merchandise or refin-
ing oil; hiring and firing the full-time executives who will actually run the company;
and exercising supervisory power with respect to the day-to-day operations of the
business. Stockholders of a large scale corporation do not do these things; as a
matter of efficient operation of a large firm with numerous residual claimants they
should not do them; and under the typical corporate statute and case law they can-
not do them.
CLARK, supra note 291, at 56-57.
295 Those terms might define shareholder voting rights, managers' duties of care and loy-
alty, shareholders' rights to dividends, or other aspects of the relationships among shareholders
and managers. Se e.g., EASTERBROOK & FiscHEL, supra note 31, at 1-4 (noting that managers
arguably attempt to offer terms that maximize share values by minimizing agency costs and sig-
naling to investors valuable information about the firm).
296 Id. at 34.
297 See id. at 34-35. Some scholars suggest that default rules may be designed to penalize
parties that fail to adopt certain explicit contract terms. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 225, at
92-95; Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of
Legal Rules, 101 YALE LJ. 729,746-59 (1992); Lucian Ayre Bebchuk & Steven Shavell, Informa-
tion and the Scope of Liability for Breach of Contract: The Rule of Hadley v. Baxendale, 7 J.L.
EcoN. & ORG. 284 (1991).
298 See Ayres, supra note 223, at 1405 (describing the difficulty in drafting contracts); cf
Alan Schwartz, The Default Rule Paradigm and the Limits of Contract Law, 3 S. CAL. IrERr isc
UJ. 389, 399-402 (1993) (describing the derivation of the "acceptability constraint" functionally).
1996]
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To inform the judgment of courts and legislatures regarding the selection
of default rules, the contractarian paradigm directs these bodies to consider
the contract terms that businesses have adopted explicitly. If such terms con-
tinue to be widely used, the argument goes, they are likely to be worthy can-
didates for use as defaults. 299 The law should impose mandatory terms on
relationships among business managers and investors only to the extent mar-
ket failures affect the process by which those terms are adopted.30
The SBO, as proposed, would allow participants maximum flexibility to
achieve the ideal organizational apparatus. Participants will be faced, in the
SBC, with minimal mandatory rules. The result is an emphasis on planning
and negotiation. Yet, while these activities involve transaction costs, the ben-
efits of a tailored, rational organizational structure for each business provide
the owners the opportunity to focus on relevant objectives, shorn free of the
artificial determinations required to satisfy current tax analyses.
Conclusion
Like a puppeteer controlling the movements of legions of puppets, the
Treasury and the Service have dictated the forms of states' business organiza-
tion law for decades. Proof of this is most clearly discerned from the recent
waves of enactment of LLCs and LLPs-imperfect business organizations
whose structure and content derives from absurd tax structures that ill-serve
the smooth and efficient transaction of business. Pandora's Box has been
opened and the result is pure folly. Now even the Treasury and Service are
questioning their role as puppeteer.
The law governing business organizations is at a watershed: never before
has it been so tempting for business lawyers to rely upon one business entity
for solving the double-tax/limited liability dichotomy-namely, the LLC.
Yet, never before has it been so obvious that the current regime is fraught
with problems and uncertainties. Upon close scrutiny, the current regime is
fundamentally flawed. Thus, the temptation to merely tinker with the law
governing current limited liability entities must be avoided. The substance of
business organization law must be reformulated to arrive at an optimal SBC
structure and corresponding SBO.
We propose a simple, all-encompassing solution: scrap the current gar-
bage heap of business organization law in favor of a unified business organi-
zational structure divided into the TCC and the SBC. The immediate benefit
is a profound simplification of business organization law, together with the
certainty and predictability that attends thereto. In addition, economic effi-
ciency, flexibility, and contractual freedom are maximized. At last, substance
can triumph over form in the domain of business firms.
299 See EASTERBROOK & FiscH-ni, supra note 31, at 34. It is suggested that the solutions
larger corporations offer should be used as default rules because larger firms are "most likely to
surmount any transaction hurdle and to spend the most time dealing with the problem once they
have elected to do so." Id. at 252.
300 Possible market failures include collective action problems, externalities, and informa-
tion imperfections that impair the ability of the capital market to price contract terms. See id- at
22-30.
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